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South Africa suffers from an acute housing shortage with the lack of access to credit partly 
to blame. The implementation of Basel III, an international regulatory framework touted to 
impact the banking sector, has been suggested as a potential catalyst to credit deterioration 
in South Africa. The purpose of this study is to assess the impact of the Basel III regulatory 
Accord on the provision of long - term housing finance in South Africa.  A combination of 
interviews with bank personnel, as well as a time – series statistical analysis utilising 
aggregate bank balance sheet data is employed to gauge how changes in banks’ balance 
sheet compositions may affect long - term housing finance. 
South African banks are historically well capitalised. However, the introduction of newly 
developed parameters in accordance with the Basel III Accord appear to threaten bank 
profitability. Findings from the study indicate that the provision of long - term housing 
finance will be compromised in certain ways with some sectors of the housing market more 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
The main conduit to home ownership for the vast majority of the South African population is 
by way of mortgage bond finance, a funding covenant usually acquired through the traditional 
retail banking sector. However, affordability constraints for the majority of consumers has 
been suggested as a hurdle to obtaining housing finance, and therefore one of the primary 
contributors to the lack of adequate housing provision in the country. Thus, a systematic 
understanding of how Basel III, a directive that has been touted to influence the banking 
sector and the provision of long - term finance, is crucial to understand. Accordingly, the aim 
of this paper is to gauge what impact the new Basel III banking regulation will have on the 
provision of long - term housing finance in South Africa. 
The first section of this chapter aims to briefly summarize the importance of long - term 
housing finance to households and the economy. The second section provides a concise 
overview of the business drivers of banking and how the Basel regulations are likely to impact 
on them. Section three outlines the research method that was used in this report and details 
the research problem, questions, aims, proposition and methodology to be used. 
1.1 Background 
 
For many South Africans, purchasing a home for the first time will not only be the largest 
investment they will ever make, but also the source of the largest financial encumbrance that 
they will ever undertake. Regrettably, whilst South Africa boasts a world - class banking 
system that consistently places in the top ten positions globally for banking soundness, and 
with over thirty banking institutions on offer, access to long - term credit for the majority of 
the population is a major concern (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2016). 
According to The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report for 2015 – 2016 
(Browne et al., 2015), South Africa was ranked 21st out of 140 countries globally for the 
affordability of financial services and 32nd for the ease of access to loans. Interpreting these 
statistics suggests that credit accessibility in South Africa is not a pressing issue. In reality 
however, a conflicting scenario prevails. Although South Africa has an exceedingly active 
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credit market, long-term mortgages only accounted for roughly 31% of all loans granted in 
2015 according to the Africa Housing Finance Yearbook, to be referred to as AHFY (2016). In 
fact, the majority of all finance granted during 2015 was of the un-secured variety; a less than 
ideal scenario.  Nevertheless, there are several reasons that contribute to these statistics. 
To start, income inequality in South Africa is endemic, with a high unemployment rate and 
low education levels contributing to a housing market that is vastly diversified in value terms. 
As an illustration, Cape Town’s Atlantic Seaboard is home to the continent’s most expensive 
residential real estate with a record recent sale of R290m; yet 90% of the residents living in 
the Alfred Nzo Municipality, in the Eastern Cape, earn less than R1, 600 per month. Evidently, 
there are consumers’ representative of all income levels in South Africa – those who simply 
need to fill the basic housing need, and others whose primary goal is investment and wealth 
creation. 
Statistics South Africa (2016) reports that South Africa’s real estate, business, and finance 
sectors are the largest contributors to the country’s GDP making up 20% of this indicator for 
the year 2016. Including the construction sector, this figure increases to almost 24% of GDP. 
Clearly, access to credit is not only immensely important for the survival of the South African 
economy as a whole, but it is just as important to consumers in the housing market. 
It has been suggested that the most important part of an economy is the availability of credit. 
By way of applying basic economic principles, this statement suggests that the extension of 
credit leads to a rise in consumer spending, and consequently increasing income levels in the 
economy. These higher income levels and elevated levels of spending may lead to a higher 
gross domestic product (GDP), and as a result, potentially faster productivity growth. If credit 
is used to purchase productive resources, it helps in economic growth and adds to income 
(Keats, 2015). Based on this statement, as well as the fact that South Africa’s residential house 
construction and rental market is a R152 billion industry sustaining employment to 468,000 
people annually demonstrates that the availability of, and access to mortgage finance is 
critical for the South African economy and individual consumers alike (Centre for Affordable 




However, arguably one of the most notable requirements for bank credit stems from the 
escalating housing costs in South Africa. In 2016 for example, it was estimated that the 
cheapest entry level home that could be built would cost in the region of R350, 000 - yet only 
16.6%% of the South African population earn more than R20, 000 per month. Based on these 
statistics, it is clear how access to bank finance is a necessity for the majority of the population 
to acquire even an entry level home (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2016). 
In 2015, residential mortgages accounted for 31 percent of all loans granted down from a 
previous base of 47 percent in 2008. On the contrary, unsecured loans increased in prevalence 
from 21 percent in 2008, to 34 percent of all loans granted in 2015 (Centre for Affordable 
Housing Finance in Africa, 2016). This adjustment of lending from that of a long - term nature 
to that of a short term nature can have severe financial implications for borrowers and society 
alike. Does this somewhat worrying trend, combined with the imminent arrival of full Basel III 
implementation, suggest a decrease in the availability of long - term housing finance in South 
Africa? This question remains to be answered. 
Erbas and Nothaft (2002, p. 4) in their International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper 
argue that the provision of affordable home mortgage loans to a large segment of a country’s 
general population can assist with both growth enhancing and redistributive objectives and 
further remark that “International experience suggests that widespread availability of home 
mortgages has a favourable impact on the quality of housing, infrastructure, and 
urbanization, in short, on improving living standards and alleviating poverty.” Erbas and 
Nothaft (2002, p. 4) continue by adding that the “widespread availability of affordable 
mortgages may enhance savings, promote financial market development, and stimulate 
investment in the housing sector.” Thus, any regulation that proposes changes to the 
country’s banking legislation, and thus potentially the credit market, runs the risk of adversely 
affecting the provision of finance to both individual consumers and corporates alike. 
Nonetheless, to be in a position to understand how households gain access to credit, and 
what factors determine the availability of credit, one needs to understand the business of 
banking, and how it is impacted upon by regulation. 
Simply, one of the many ways in which banks make money is to ‘borrow’ money at a certain 
cost from a variety of sources that include retail depositors (by way of offering savings and 
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cheque accounts to individuals and companies), wholesale funders (borrowed funds from 
institutional investors), and via funding on the wholesale market (borrowing from other 
banks), and then lending out these ‘borrowed’ funds at a higher interest rate to individuals or 
companies whom require long - term funding for investment purposes. In the words of 
Bezoen (2015, p. 1), “Banks function as the main provider of credit intermediation between 
investors and suppliers and provide critical services to consumers and businesses.” Naturally, 
any regulation that tampers with the flow of credit between banks and consumers has the 
potential to disrupt economic growth. 
The third Basel Accord, known simply as Basel III, is being implemented globally between 2013 
and 2019. This revised banking protocol has been suggested as a potential catalyst for 
reduced levels of lending as a result of the revised minimum capital requirements, and the 
newly introduced liquidity conditions. Yadav et al. (2014) report that the recapitalization 
efforts of banks’ will affect banks’ supply of funds, thereby driving them to look for ways to 
reduce lending to ensure regulatory minimums are upheld. 
The Availability and the Affordability of Bank Credit 
The relationship between bank lending and the broad topic of residential housing is an 
interesting debate. Additionally, what an impact on bank lending essentially means, and 
how it can affect the housing market is important to understand. Housing markets in South 
Africa are largely dependent on the ability of consumers to not only access bank finance, but 
be in a position to afford bank finance as well. Pearson and Greeff (2006), as cited by Rust 
(2006), note that the Financial Sector Charter of 2004 has given low income earners 
accessibility to multiple forms of credit; which has ultimately resulted in negative strain on 
their debt profiles, and compromised their affordability of housing. 
Demand and supply tells us that when the supply of bank credit deteriorates, the amount of 
available housing should inevitably diminish as well - a less than ideal scenario for a 
developing country such as South Africa. There are two key measures that impact an 
individual’s ability to obtain finance: i.) the affordability of finance and ii.) the availability of 
finance. Understandably, any directive that is set to decreases the affordability of finance 
(such as an increase in interest rates or a reduction in the term of the loan), as well as the 
availability of finance (i.e. a reduction in credit supply), will have undesired consequences on 
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housing markets and the ability of consumers to access housing markets. Basel III is a 
regulation that can influence both of these measures, and thus has the ability to directly 
implicate the housing sector as well as the ability of consumers to access the housing 
market. Evidently, bank finance is arguably the most important link in the housing chain, 
and is vital to its efficient operation. Therefore, how the new Basel III regulation is likely to 
impact the availability of long - term finance, and the affordability of finance, is crucial to 
understand. Equally important to understand is how the various sectors of the housing 
market are likely to be impacted by the Basel III Accord. 
1.2 The Basel Accords 
 
The global banking environment has largely been governed by the Basel Accords as set by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This set of banking regulations, initially introduced 
in 1998 with the implementation of Basel I, aims to improve the supervision, regulation, and 
practices of banks worldwide with the objective of boosting financial stability (BFIS, 2016). 
However, as respectable as these measures are, there are both economic and institutional 
implications that need consideration. Proponents of the Accords argue that the large majority 
of noteworthy international banks, as evidenced by the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis, are over 
leveraged and undercapitalised (Kasakende et al., 2012) and thus need an auditory body to 
ensure that reckless lending and perilous speculation initiatives come to an end. Opponents 
of the Accords argue that the availability of credit, as well as a degree of regulatory leniency 
on the banking environment, is essential to sustained economic growth. 
Fundamentally, the Basel Accords are largely centred on the premise of strengthening the 
financial soundness of banks by means of boosting their minimum capital requirements; or 
simply, the amount of regulatory capital held as a percentage of risk weighted assets (RWA) 
i.e. loans (bank assets) that are weighed according to their inherent risk. To remain compliant 
with these minimum regulatory capital requirements, banks can do one of three things. 
Either, i.) increase their capital levels by retaining earning’s or issuing new capital, ii.) decrease 
their overall level of assets or alternatively, iii.) maintain the quantity of their asset base whilst 
shifting towards less risky assets (Cumming and Nel, 2005). 
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Capital on a bank’s balance sheet comes in various forms and is categorised by its ability to 
absorb losses (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2010) and includes i.)  Debt (i.e. subordinated debt), ii.) 
Equity (i.e. shareholders’ funds and retained earnings), as well as iii.) Preference shares. The 
best quality capital is dubbed ‘Tier 1 capital’ and includes securities such as common shares 
and other innovative instruments that have equity like characteristics. The next category of 
capital is referred to as Tier 2 capital and is composed of instruments such as Preference 
shares; whilst Tier 3 capital, the lowest class of capital, includes subordinated debt (Norton 
Rose Fulbright, 2010). Since inception, the Basel Accords have evolved with the ever changing 
financial landscape, and have been revised to address any pitfalls in their makeup.  
1.2.1 History of the Basel Accords 
 
Basel I 
The International Basel Committee on Bank Supervision (BCBS) introduced the first Basel 
Accord, Basel I, in July 1988 with the intention of creating a series of regulatory guidelines 
that sought to reduce institutional credit risk within the banking sector (AdvisoryHQ, 2016). 
Basel I was predominantly aimed at addressing the credit risk facing banking institutions and 
overlooked the supplementary risks that banks frequently encounter. Balin (2008) mentions 
that Basel I was simply drafted to ensure that banks’ held adequate capital to mitigate against 
risk in the creditworthiness of its loan book. However, it had no capital directive to guard 
against additional risks such as interest rate variations, currency fluctuations, and general 
macroeconomic slumps. The omission of a framework to guard against these additional 
threats is one of a number of criticisms aimed at Basel I. As a result, Basel II was introduced 
in 2004 to adapt to the shifting financial environment, and to address some of the 
shortcoming of the first Basel Accord. 
Basel II 
Basel II, as described by Heid (2007), sought to better align regulatory capital with economic 
risk and strongly emphasised the quality of assets, as opposed to the type of assets. The 
second Basel Accord adopted the framework of the first Accord and expanded its parameters 
to include the three pillars as described below (Bank for International Settlements, 2016): 
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i. Pillar 1: Minimum Capital Requirements 
ii. Pillar 2: Supervisory Review Process 
iii. Pillar 3: Market Discipline 
In summary, as the name suggests, the first pillar determines the calculation of the amount 
of capital to be held by banks’ depending on the transaction type. The revised Accord included 
two different approaches to calculating capital requirements – the ‘Standardized Approach’, 
and the ‘Internal Ratings Based Approaches’. The second pillar, as Balin (2008) mentions, is 
intended to address bank-regulator collaboration, and strengthen the rights of the regulator 
in bank supervision and dissolution. Essentially, regulators are given greater authority to 
oversee and implement new risk protocols within the banks’ if needed.  The final pillar sets 
to improve market discipline within a country’s banking sector and encourages banks to 
disclose capital and risk-taking positions to the general public (Balin, 2008).  
Subsequent to the financial collapse of 2007 – 2008, the prevailing Basel II Accord at the time 
was heavily criticized, with accusations of ineffectiveness, and indictments pertaining to the 
inadequate assessment of risk (AdvisoryHQ, 2016). In response, the Basel Committee decided 
that the international banking community lacked both transparency and accountability, and 
to avoid another banking crisis additional supervision was needed as to how banks’ reported 
‘Tier 1’ capital (AdvisoryHQ, 2016). Resultantly, Basel III was introduced in December 2010 to 
resolve some of the criticisms aimed at the Basel II Accord. 
Basel III 
The Basel Committee set itself three main objectives as a pre-requisite to the formation of 
Basel III that include (AdvisoryHQ, 2016): 
1. Ensuring that participating banks are robust enough to survive future financial shocks 
without causing contagion to other economies or sectors. 
2. Imposing better risk mitigation strategies on all facets of the financial industry.  
3. Solidifying the financial sectors' governance, disclosure practices, and overall 
transparency. 
As well as a modification to what is deemed as an acceptable form of regulatory capital for 
banks to hold, three new principal components have been included as part of the revised 
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Basel III framework. Namely, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (to address short term liquidity), 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (to address long - term liquidity) and the Leverage Ratio (to limit the 
amount of borrowing/gearing the banks undertake). These three metrics control a banks 
liquidity position and financial gearing, and will be assessed in greater detail to uncover their 
effects on bank profitability. 
1.3 Return on Equity 
 
The continuing implementation of the Basel frameworks into the global banking environment 
through the three Basel Accords will have, and have had, a direct effect on banks’ return on 
equity (ROE) ratios, or put differently, the return that is generated on shareholders’ funds. 
The worldwide banking sector peaked in 2006 with record profits among America’s six largest 
banks hovering around $82.6 Billion whilst ROE’s among these banks averaged 23.5%. 
However, in 2012 post the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis, ROE’s were reduced to approximately 
3. 9% - less than twenty percent of the 2006 highs, even though banking profits have ascended 
back to over $61 Billion. In light of this statistic, banks have recognised the importance of 
increasing ROE, and so have implemented a renewed business focus around attempting to 
increase this measure as opposed to purely seeking higher profits.  
The introduction of Basel III will likely have a significant impact on the South African banking 
sector’s profitability through a combination of increased capital adequacy ratios and 
augmented liquidity requirements; ultimately resulting in a negative impact on the provision 
of long - term housing finance. These constraints are expected to adversely affect banks’ ROE 
and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) - two of the most analysed indicators of a bank’s profitability. 
However, there is a contrarian school of thought on the matter which suggests that Basel III 
will force banks to cut back on lending against risky assets, and so will increase their exposure 
to retail housing sectors (Yadav et al., 2014).  
We find that the implementation of Basel III is expected to negatively impact the provision of 
long - term housing finance in South Africa. However, the nature and extent of this impact is 
unknown. This paper seeks to identify to what extent the proposed Basel III regulations will 
have on the availability of, and the cost of, long-term housing finance. Further to this, how 
each housing sector is likely to be impacted in its individual capacity should the availability of 
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long - term funding be compromised, will also be explored. To begin, each of the Basel 
regulations and their principle components will be studied with the purpose of understanding 
exactly what these Accords encompass and how they currently have, and may affect the 
provision of housing finance. Subsequent to this, the degree to which the South African 
economy relies on the provision of, and the structure of long-term housing finance will then 
be uncovered. Marrying the results of these two studies will provide a better explanation as 
to how Basel III will affect both the housing market, as well as the individual consumer. 
1.4.1 Research Problem 
 
There are three stratums to this problem that this research recognizes and aims to bring 
together. In short, i.) society needs housing; ii.) the general population needs long-term 
housing finance in order to acquire housing; and iii.) the proposed regulatory changes via the 
implementation of Basel III will potentially discourage the provision of long - term housing 
finance by banks. 
1.4.2 Research Questions 
 
Main Question: 
1. When compared to Basel I and Basel II, what effect will the implementation of Basel 
III have on the provision of long - term housing finance in South Africa? 
Sub-Questions: 
1.1  How does Basel III affect bank profitability, and will Basel III have an impact on the 
viability of the provision of long - term housing finance by lending institutions? 
1.2  Based on the above, how will this impact on the extent and nature of housing finance 
provision? 
1.4.3 Research Aim 
 
To determine the impact of Basel III on the availability, and the cost, of long - term housing 
finance that is required to address the housing problem in South Africa. 
10 
 
1.4.4 Research Proposition 
 
The implementation of Basel III is expected to have a direct negative effect on the profitability 
of the banking sector, which will reduce the availability and increase the cost of housing 
finance, and therefore will impact negatively on the provision of housing in South Africa. 
1.4.5 Research Objectives 
 
- To understand the fundamentals of the Basel III Accord, including the calculation of Risk 
Weighted Assets (RWA), Probability of Default (PD), Exposure at Default (EAD), and Loss 
Given Default (LGD).  
- To assess whether the introduction of Basel III will have an impact on overall bank 
profitability. 
- To determine how the impact of Basel III on bank profitability will influence long - term 
housing finance provision. 
- With particular reference to mortgage loans, in what ways will South African banks react 
to regulatory changes in capital requirements. 
- To establish whether banks respond to changes in capital requirements by changing risk-
weighted assets, or by varying qualifying capital, or by employing both of these strategies. 
- Determining the final impact on the provision of housing finance and hence housing 
provision. 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
Due to the fact that Basel III is yet to be introduced, and its implications still unidentified - the 
research framework will largely be exploratory in nature. However, as Basel III has evolved 
from the premise of Basel II, there will also be a degree of research that is explanatory in 
nature. 
The research will utilize a mixed method approach consisting of both qualitative and 
quantitative research designs. The qualitative aspect of the research will employ a ‘field 
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survey’ research design whereby leading banking officials will be interviewed regarding the 
potential impact of Basel III on long-term housing finance in South Africa.  
The qualitative findings will be corroborated through a quantitative descriptive statistical 
analysis of lending activity, and the structure of banks’ balance sheets between 2005 (Pre - 
Basel II) and 2016 (Build up to Basel III implementation). This analysis will be modelled around 
a time-series research technique developed by Cummings and Nel (2005).  
1.6 Research Contributions 
 
The housing problem in South Africa is a major concern, with the lack of access to adequate 
housing due in part to the limited supply of credit to consumers. Consequently, how the 
impending Basel III bank regulations are likely to effect the supply of credit to the end-user is 
important to understand.  
As alluded to beforehand, the housing segment in South Africa is particularly extensive, with 
consumers of all income levels potentially impacted in disparate ways by changes in bank 
regulation. At the base of the income scale, consumers are simply trying to realise the basic 
housing need whilst also having a tangible investment. At the higher end of the income 
spectrum, individuals are acquiring residential property for both their primary use, as well as 
using residential property as a conduit for investment. Either way, what is evident is that the 
housing sector is a major contributor to South Africa’s employment, infrastructure 
development, and economic growth. Evidence to this is the fact that South Africa’s 
construction sector contributes nearly 1,500,000 jobs to the country’s workforce (Statistics 
South Africa, 2016). However, according to Jordan and Wilse - Samson (2015) , this figure 
should be considerably more with a further 1,000,000 jobs on offer as a result of housing 
construction and its allied spin-offs. 
In general, the construction industry creates jobs that are particularly suited to less skilled 
workers - the predominant labour force segment in South Africa, and the primary contributors 
to the unemployment crisis that the country faces. Interestingly, in China, a country that is 
largely known for its strength in manufacturing and its accompanying workforce, has had 
roughly the same amount of direct jobs created in the construction sector than what was 
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created in the manufacturing sector over the past 10 years. Furthermore, China’s recent 
contraction in housing is revealing the extent to which its manufacturing sector depended not 
only on exports, but on construction as well (Jordan and Wilse - Samson, 2015). 
Resultantly, for a number of reasons, this paper will offer additional value to the economic 
based literature of the residential housing sector, as well as offer further insight into how 
changes in banking regulation may have an impact on the demand and supply of housing, as 
well as the ability to access the housing market.  
Insight into the complex nature of Basel III, its mechanics, as well as what this Accord is trying 
to achieve is paramount in understanding how and why changes in these banking regulations 
are likely to result in externalities on the housing market, and the availability of long - term 
finance. Additionally, establishing how banks are likely to respond to a decrease in 
profitability, and what influence these responses may have on the housing sector can be a 















Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides a review of the existing literature relating to the anticipated effects of 
the Basel III Accord on the provision of long - term housing finance in both a South African 
and international context. The provision of finance by the commercial banking sector, the 
main supplier of credit in South Africa, is heavily dependent on the regulations that govern 
the banking sector. Correspondingly, the delivery of housing to the South African market is 
largely dependent on the availability of credit. As a consequence, any regulation that impacts 
the banking sector, will naturally have an impact on the accessibility to credit. Therefore, an 
overview of the three sets of banking regulations collectively known as the Basel Accords, and 
how they have influenced the banking sector is paramount when gauging the effects of the 
Basel III regulation. 
It is well acknowledged that South Africa suffers from an acute housing shortage with over 2 
million households still living in informal dwellings – estimated at roughly 7 million people 
(Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2016). However, as well as having its 
challenges, the South African property market is also an important contributor to the South 
African economy. Owing to the fact that Basel III is still in the implementation stage, the 
current literature is sparse in terms of the expected effects that the Basel III Accord will have 
on the provision of long - term housing finance in South Africa. As a result, this study aims to 
enrich the current contribution of literature on offer by determining whether the provision of 
long - term housing finance will be impacted by the Basel III regulatory Accord in South Africa. 
The first section of this chapter provides a brief history of the Basel Accords along with a 
description of their core mechanics and their associated objectives. The concepts that are 
relevant to all of the Accords will be explicated in further detail as the understanding of these 
concepts at the onset is imperative in order to gain a proper understanding of how the Basel 
regulations can affect long - term housing finance and the provision thereof. Additionally, to 
fully appreciate what the current literature articulates, and why this material is pertinent, a 
solid grasp of the Basel fundamentals is necessary. Accordingly, a description of the central 
framework underpinning the Basel Accords will be carried out, with Basel III a primary focus. 
Thereafter, what the literature suggests as to how each specific element of the Basel III 
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regulation is projected to effect long - term housing finance will be explained. This section will 
then give a brief synopsis as to how the consumer may be impacted by each of these 
individual components. The chapter will then be concluded by outlining what the current 
literature conveys as to what implications the Basel III Accord is anticipated to have on bank 
profitability, the macro economy, and lending rates. 
2.1 The Basel Accords 
 
The topic of bank regulation has been an ongoing debate over the years with opposing views 
on the subject. Exponents of bank regulation commonly put forward two justifications for its 
necessity: the risk of a systemic crisis, as well as the inability of depositors to monitor banks 
(Goodhart et al (2008) as referenced by Santos, 2001). A systemic banking crisis refers to a 
situation in which numerous banks within a country experience serious solvency problems or 
liquidity constraints simultaneously - either because the failure of one bank (or a group of 
banks) spreads to other banks in the system, or because all banks are effected by a particular 
outside shock (World Bank, 2015). The most recent example of such a crisis was the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis of 2007 – 2008 that led to the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, as well as the 
bailout of numerous other systemically important banks (banks that are regarded as ‘too big 
to fail’). The inability of depositors to monitor banks, the second justification for bank 
regulation as suggested by Goodhart et al (2008), advocates the need for a body that is 
representative of depositors to limit adverse selection and moral hazard within the banking 
industry. Both of these justifications present valid arguments for the regulation of banking 
systems as evidenced by the excessive risk – taking that led up to the 2007 - 2008 financial 
crisis that brought the world’s financial markets to their worst levels since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s.  
Conversely, adversaries of bank regulation argue that too much bank regulation impedes 
economic growth, and that less regulation is required to increase profitability (Cafariello, 
2014). Nonetheless, concerns about bank regulation were ultimately addressed with the 




The Basel Accords, originally assembled by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) are known as: 
“the primary global standard setter for the prudential regulation of banks and provides a 
forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its mandate is to strengthen the 
regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing 
financial stability (Bank for International Settlements, 2016, para 1).” 
The Basel Accords are extremely complex in their composition and to fully grasp the 
constitution of the Accords would require a review that is beyond the confines of this thesis. 
However, there are a number of concepts that are central to all of the Accords that require a 
rudimentary understanding in order to gain an appreciation of not only how the Basel Accords 
function, but also what the Accords are aiming to achieve. This thesis aims to address how 
long - term housing finance will be impacted by the implementation of Basel III. To answer 
this question, it is essential to understand why Basel III and the provision of finance are 
related, and in what context. Understanding this relationship will assist in showing how the 
implementation of Basel III may impact the provision of long - term housing finance. 
Accordingly, a summary of the Basel Accords including a description of their components is a 
necessity.  To begin, the first two Basel Accords will be summarised with the aspects that are 
most likely to have an impact on the provision of housing finance outlined. Thereafter, the 
third Basel Accord will be reviewed with the aspects that are most pertinent to long - term 
housing finance emphasised. 
2.1.1 Basel I 
 
The International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, commonly 
known as Basel I (to be referred to as Basel I), was originated in 1988 with two fundamental 
objectives. The first objective was to strengthen the stability and soundness of the 
international banking system, while the second objective was uniformity in its application to 
different international banks with a vision to reduce a source of competitive disparity among 




The first Basel Accord was largely directed at credit risk (the risk of counterparty default), 
while other risks such as interest rate risk and investment risk were essentially left to be dealt 
with by supervisors in the respective countries (Bank for International Settlements, 1988). 
Essentially, the Basel I Accord was divided into four pillars: Namely, the Constituents of 
Capital, the Risk Weighting of Assets, a Target Standard Ratio, as well as the Transitional and 
Implementing  Agreements (Balin, 2008). 
Basel I addressed credit risk through the introduction of a ‘minimum capital requirement’ 
rule, as well as through a concept termed the risk-weighting of assets (RWA) - a process that 
classifies bank loans according to their perceived credit risk. Credit risk, as defined by the Bank 
for International Settlements (2000), is the potential that a bank borrower will fail to meet 
their obligations in accordance with the agreed terms. Therefore, to mitigate against credit 
risk, banks are required to hold a percentage of capital against their risk weighted assets. 
Assets that are deemed ‘risky’ in nature inherit a high ‘risk-weighting’ while assets that are 
‘less risky’ in nature are assigned a lower ‘risk – weighting’. The risk weightings as prescribed 
by the Basel I Accord are shown below in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Basel I Standardized Approach Risk – Weightings 
 
Risk Weight Asset Class 
0% 
Cash and gold held in the bank. Obligation on OECD governments and U.S. 
treasuries. 
20% 
Claims on OECD banks. Securities issued by US government agencies. Claims 
on municipalities. 
50% Residential mortgages. 
100% 
All other claims such as corporate bonds, less-developed countries' debt, 
claims on non - OECD banks, equities, real estate, plant and equipment. 
Source: BIS (1988) 
 
Perhaps the simplest way to demonstrate this calculation is by way of a simple example. 
Suppose that a conventional home loan of R1, 000,000 carried a ‘risk - weighting’ of 50% (as 
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prescribed by the Basel I regulation). The RWA of this home loan would then be calculated as 
R1, 000,000 * 50% = R500, 000.  As the Basel I regulation stipulated that a minimum of 8% 
capital was to be held against a bank’s risk weighted assets, the total capital holding for this 
loan would then be calculated as R500, 000 X 8% = R40, 000. Therefore, against a R1, 000,000 
loan, a total of R40, 000 would need to be held. As demonstrated, for every loan that a bank 
advances, a proportion of the value of the asset is held with the end goal of creating a capital 
buffer (Dagher et al. (2016). 
To understand the impact of these regulations on the business of banking, one needs to 
understand the basics of a bank’s balance sheet.  
In brief, a bank’s balance sheet is broken into two parts. An asset side, as well as a liability 
side (and equity). Assets are items that the bank owns and includes items such as bank 
reserves, loans to customers, as well as securities and other investments (which are divided 
into the banking book and the trading book). Banking book assets are securities that are not 
intended to be sold (i.e. low-risk securities that earn a return on idle cash if there are no 
profitable lending opportunities), whereas the trading book included assets that must be 
valued daily at their market price (i.e. derivatives and other securities held by banks in their 
capacity as market makers). Liabilities are what the bank owes to other parties. Liabilities in 
the context of this description are used to fund the assets of the banking institution. Items 
include deposits, as well as short and long - term debt. The difference between the assets and 
liabilities is known as the equity portion – or the portion which shareholders have a claim to. 
Shareholder equity is mainly comprised of retained profits (i.e. earnings not paid to 
shareholders as dividends) as well as the proceeds the bank has received from selling its 
shares to investors (Oppenheimer and Hollingsworth, 2014). In the context of Basel, capital is 
the equity that is held on banks’ balance sheets, and the capital requirement is the amount 
of equity (amongst other securities) than needs to be held by the bank in relation to its assets. 
For a number of reasons, and specifically relative to the understanding of Basel III, equity is 
important for a variety of reasons: 1.) equity is loss absorbing 2.) equity funds assets similar 




Effectively, bank capital acts as a cushion to absorb potential losses that may be incurred by 
a bank during periods of financial distress. In the event of a loss situation, the regulatory 
capital as specified by the Basel I Accord is drawn on before investor deposits are 
compromised. Norton Rose Fulbright (2010) remarks that the Basel framework imposes 
capital adequacy requirements that restrict the amount of assets that a bank may have as a 
multiple of its capital which helps insure that losses can be absorbed without compromising 
the rights of depositors and creditors.  Thus, the requirement to hold capital is a form of 
protection to both depositors of money, as well as the economy at large. Essentially, the goal 
of employing a minimum capital requirement as per the Basel frameworks is to transfer risk 
from depositors of funds, back to the bank and its shareholders. 
How Basel I Defines Capital 
Basel I introduced a two tier system for the definition of capital: Tier 1 capital (known as core 
capital) and Tier 2 capital (known as supplementary capital). The Bank for International 
Settlements (1988) defines Tier 1 capital as permanent shareholders’ equity (i.e. issued and 
fully paid ordinary shares and perpetual non – cumulative preference shares) and disclosed 
reserves (i.e. retained earnings). Whereas Tier 2 capital as defined by Nayak (2013) includes 
all other capital such as hidden reserves, long – term debt with maturity greater than five 
years, and gains on investment assets. As expected, Tier 1 capital is considered higher quality 
capital then Tier 2 capital as evidenced by its composition and its ability to absorb losses. 
Simply, banks make money by obtaining funding from one source at a particular interest rate, 
and then on-lending these funds at a higher interest rate than what the funds were borrowed 
for. The difference between the interest rate of the borrowed funds, and the interest rate 
charged to the end user is known as the ‘margin.’ The margin earned on a transaction is 
essentially the banks profit on the contract. However, banks need to procure these funds from 
various sources in order to be in a position to extend these funds in the form of bank loans. 
Oppenheimer and Hollingsworth (2014), outline three primary sources which banks can draw 
on to fund their lending activities: 
i. Deposits: includes savings accounts, cheque accounts, and certificates of deposits. 
ii. Debt: includes both short term loans as well as long - term borrowings.  
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iii. Equity: proceeds that a bank has received from selling shares on the open market to 
investors as well as retained earnings. 
Bank capital that is held to comply with the Basel regulations cannot comprise of depositors’ 
funds, but primarily of shareholder equity; ultimately shifting the risk from depositors of funds 
to equity shareholders. As a result, depositors are offered a layer of protection on their 
investment as their funds cannot be used to absorb bank losses. As shareholder funds can be 
used in times of financial distress as a capital buffer to draw upon, they require a higher return 
on their investment in exchange for the additional risk borne. Consequently, shareholders 
have a direct claim on a banks profit in the form of dividends. For this reason, equity is 
considered an expensive form of funding when compared to other capital sources (Investec, 
2016). 
Nevertheless, banks hold capital from a variety of sources to fund their business initiatives 
that generally comprises of shareholder equity (and retained earnings), subordinated debt, 
and preference shares - all in varying degrees. The degrees to which these capital holdings 
are limited are explicitly stated by the Basel Accords. The first Basel regulation prescribed a 
minimum capital requirement of 8% of RWA to be held by banks. However, of the 8% capital 
requirement, a minimum of 50% of the banks’ capital base has to consist of Tier 1 capital, and 
Tier 2 capital is permitted up to an amount equal to (but no more than) the Tier 1 capital 
portion i.e. 4% Tier 1 and 4% Tier 2 for a total capital holding of 8%. It is important to note 
that the national regulators in a specific jurisdiction have the right to enforce higher capital 
holding requirements over and above the minimums as prescribed by the Basel Accords. The 
South African Reserve Bank (SARB) for instance has traditionally imposed capital holding 
requirements beyond what has been set by the BCBS. 
Advantages and Disadvantages 
The Basel I Accord introduced a uniform definition of capital adequacy globally, and brought 
an awareness to judicious capital management across the financial industry (AdvisoryHQ, 
2016). However, although the regulation had its merits, there was still room to improve the 
directive in a number of capacities. 
Roy et al. (2013) identified a number of benefits that the first Basel Accord introduced to the 
banking sector that included: 
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i. A fairly simple framework. 
ii. Internationally active banks demonstrated a considerable increase in capital adequacy 
ratios. 
iii. Increased competitive equality among internationally active banks. 
iv. Global adoption of Basel. 
However, along with the advantages that the Basel I Accord offered, a number of 
disadvantages ultimately become evident including the fact that (Roy et al., 2013): 
i. Capital adequacy solely depended on credit risk, and other risks such as operational 
and market risk were overlooked. 
ii. The assessment of credit risk did not take into account the difference in credit quality 
among debtors. 
iii. No emphasis on market values but rather on book values. 
Supplementary to the shortcomings identified above, a number of drawbacks pertaining to 
the Basel I Accord are noteworthy to this research. Balin (2008) mentions that the Accord 
gave misaligned incentives to banks, and as a result of the ‘absoluteness’ of Basel I’s risk-
weightings, banks identified ways to bypass Basel I’s standards and add more risk to their 
asset books than what was originally intended by the Accord. Balin (2008) includes a further 
criticism of the Accord relating to its application to emerging markets by mentioning that 
although the Basel I Accord was not intended to be adopted by emerging market economies, 
it generated foreseen and unforeseen distortions within the banking sectors of industrialized 
economies as a result of its application to emerging economies under the pressure of 
international policy and business communities. 
Ultimately, critics of the Accord felt that additional measures beyond capital ratios were 
needed to assess the true risk potential of a bank (AdvisoryHQ, 2016). Consequently, a revised 
regulatory framework commonly known as Basel II was introduced.  
2.1.2 Basel II 
 
In June 2004, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released the ‘International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework’, also 
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known as Basel II. The revised Accord set to address the criticisms directed at the first Basel 
Accord, and so implemented measures to ensure that other risk types were also addressed.  
To accomplish the renewed focus of a more comprehensive risk mitigation policy, the Basel II 
Accord was established upon three pillars all of which aimed to achieve different initiatives:  
i. Pillar 1 – Minimum Regulatory Capital 
ii. Pillar 2  - Supervisory Review 
iii. Pillar 3 – Market Discipline 
 
Pillar 1 – Minimum Regulatory Capital (Credit Risk, Market Risk, and Operational Risk) 
Credit Risk 
This first pillar, also known as Minimum Regulatory Capital, saw the largest amount of 
development since the implementation of the first Basel Accord (Balin, 2008) and sought to 
address credit risk, market risk, and operational risk – all of which are assessed in different 
ways.  A noteworthy modification to the first pillar of the Basel I Accord when measuring 
credit risk is the methodology that could be used by banks to calculate RWA. As described 
earlier, calculation of RWA as per the first Accord was completely inflexible in nature with all 
risk-weightings pre-determined as per the standardized approach table included in the 
preceding section. The logic used for the assessment of credit risk was arguably inadequate 
as demonstrated by the following example: 
According to the first Basel Accord, a residential home loan necessitates a 50% risk weighting. 
Therefore a home loan to, for example, a forty year old professionally qualified salaried 
employee earning R1,500,000 and buying a house in Camps Bay would require the same 
amount of capital to be held as a twenty two year old non-degreed self – employed individual 
earning R240,000 that is purchasing an apartment in Johannesburg CBD. Clearly, the bank 
loan to the forty year old professional is less risky than the bank loan to the twenty two year 
old buying an apartment in Johannesburg CBD, and yet the same amount of capital was held 
against these two transactions. As demonstrated, it’s clear how banks can be disadvantaged 
by using a ‘blanket’ approach when determining the risk – weighting of their assets. This 
approach, known as the ‘standardized approach’, is not exceedingly risk sensitive and its 
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application not sophisticated in nature.  Therefore, to address complications like the example 
mentioned above, the revised Basel II framework introduced the Internal Ratings Based 
approaches. Namely the ‘Foundation Internal Rating Based Approach’ and the ‘Advanced 
Internal Rating Based Approach’ (to be referred collectively to as IRBA). 
Internal Ratings Based Approaches 
Generally speaking, banks earn a significant part of their income through their ability to loan 
money at a higher interest rate than what the funds are borrowed for.  Therefore, in theory, 
the more banks are able to lend money, the higher their income should be. So, if capital 
cannot be loaned out, but needs to be held for regulatory purposes, the bank is subject to 
decreased profitability. Therefore, any opportunity for banks to hold less capital would in all 
likelihood be eagerly perused, as this offers an opportunity to increase profitability. The 
Internal Ratings Based Approaches afford banks this opportunity. 
Roy et al. (2013) mention that internal rating based approaches allow banks to measure credit 
risk by assigning an internal rating decided by themselves, as opposed to adopting an external 
rating provided by external credit rating agencies. This method effectively allows banks to 
rate their own loans according to the borrower type, as well as the nature of transaction; and 
so banks can legitimately hold less capital against ‘less-risky’ loans resulting in higher 
profitability on that specific transaction. Balin (2008) solidifies this statement by ascertaining 
that if banks adopt the internal ratings based approaches, the Basel Committee is offering 
them the opportunity to hold less capital reserves and thus benefit from higher profitability. 
Foundation Internal Ratings Based Approach 
The internal ratings based approaches employ an intricate set of formulae in the assessment 
of RWA and a comprehensive review of their mechanics is not necessary for this research. 
However, there are a few concepts that are worth understanding as they form the basis of 
the Internal Ratings Based Approaches, and demonstrate how bank lending can be influenced 
as a result of their use.  
Credit risk is categorized into two types of losses: expected loss (EL) and unexpected loss (UL). 
Expected losses are the average loses that would be expected from an exposure or a portfolio 
of assets (loans) over a given period of time. Therefore, banks usually create impairment 
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provisions for these losses to offset expected losses as part of the accounting process 
(Investec, 2016). According to Schuermann (2004), the expected loss on a lending transaction 
utilizes four key parameters to assess credit risk: 
• Probability of Default (PD) – the probability over a one year time horizon, expressed 
as a percentage that a borrower will default.   
• Loss Given Default (LGD) – in the event of a borrower defaulting, this is the loss that 
the bank would incur expressed as a percentage of the exposure at default. 
• Exposure at Default (EAD) – the amount of exposure (as opposed to the percentage) 
when a loan is in default. 
• M (M) – remaining term of the loan. 
Formulary, the expected loss on a transaction is the product of the probability of default, the 
loss given default, and the exposure at default (EL = PD*LGD*EAD). 
On the contrary, unexpected losses are those losses that occur over and above the expected 
losses, and banks are required to hold capital in order to cover these unexpected loses. The 
amount of capital required (also known as the capital demand) to cover these losses is 
determined by calculating the RWAs. Banks that have adopted the internal ratings based 
approaches are permitted to use their own specific internal models when calculating UL. The 
PD models, a key component of the UL calculation, allow the estimation of risk parameters 
based upon statistical methods as opposed to simple estimates. PD models are intended to 
rate credit risk (Investec, 2016) and ultimately assign a ‘score’ to a particular borrower. A 
number of factors, both quantitative and qualitative, are taken into account when assigning 
a ‘score’ to a particular borrower. In the case of an individual, the most common purchaser 
of residential property in South Africa, inputs such as the below are considered: 
 
Quantitative Inputs Qualitative Inputs 
Debt Service to Income Ratio Age 
Disposable Income Ration Qualification 
Financial Leverage Employment Status and Household Income 
Fixed Income Residency Status 




Very simply, once the data from these inputs are collated, an overall ‘score’ is then assigned 
to a specific individual. The score that has been calculated has a corresponding PD and risk 
grade that is assigned to it. Depending on the score that is calculated, the IRB model 
effectively assists the bank in calculating how much capital it needs to protect itself against 
unexpected losses that may arise from the loan that it originates. Evidently, riskier 
transactions with higher PD’s command a higher capital requirement for the banks and vice-
versa; perhaps an indication that engaging in this type of lending is unfavourable. The 
foundation internal ratings based approach allows banks to estimate the PD whereas the LGD, 
EAD, and Maturity are estimated by the regulators. 
As an example, how a 32 year old BCOM graduate with low debt levels earning R450, 000 and 
living in Durban has behaved historically (financially) contributes towards the estimation 
process of the bank when determining the PD. Hence, the quality of the historical data input 
is vital to an accurate risk reflection using the IRBA’s. Bakiciol et al. (2008) say that a large data 
requirement of more than 5 years is required for use of the IRBA’s, and that a large investment 
on the banks part is required to put these approaches in place and maintain them. 
Limitations of the PD Models 
Although comprehensively more advanced than the standardized approach, there are a few 
noteworthy limitations to the PD Models (Investec, 2016): 
• Large amounts of data are required to develop the PD models, and if data quality is 
poor, the model will yield incorrect estimates 
• Not all factors that indicate a borrower is at risk of defaulting are taken into account. 
Resultantly, expert credit risk knowledge is still a crucial part of a banks  overall credit 
risk management process 
• Assumptions are made in the PD Models that may result in estimates that are not 
100% accurate 
Balin (2008) remarks that the IRB approaches allow banks to engage in self – surveillance, and 
that unnecessary risk-taking will result in banks having to hold more capital (which results in 
less profitability). Further, self – surveillance avoids potential legal battles between regulators 
and banks and so decreases the costs of regulation. Balin (2008, p. 9) continues by saying that 
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“the ‘tailoring’ of risk weights allows additional capital to be channelled to the private 
sector—because public debt is no longer ‘more trusted’ by assumption, banks will be more 
apt to lend to private sources. This, in turn, increases the depth of the banking sector in a 
country’s economy, and in sum, encourages economic growth. ‘Poor’ risks can no longer hide 
under a rather arbitrary risk ‘category,’ preventing the tendency of banks to ‘wiggle’ risks 
around category-based weights.” 
Advanced Internal Rating Based Approach 
The advanced internal rating based approach is similar to the foundation IRB however the 
LGD, EAD and Maturity are also estimated by the bank (as opposed to regulators) based on 





As demonstrated in the above graph, one can note the benefit to a bank whom uses the IRB 
approach to calculate the RWA for an individual whom has a credit card product with the 
banking institution when compared to Basel I and the Basel II Standardized Approach. 
What is important to note is that all banks utilising the IRBA’s have internally ‘built’ their own 
specific risk weighting models, and so may encounter different results for the same consumer 
profile when compared to another bank. For this reason, the South African Reserve Bank 
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conducts periodic inspections of individual banks IRB models to ensure that there is some 
consistency between them. 
Market Risk 
The second element of risk addressed by the first pillar of the Accord is that of market risk, or 
the risk of losses of on – and off – balance sheet positions that arise from movements in 
market prices including equity positions, foreign exchange rates and interest rates (Bakiciol 
et al., 2008). As market risk traditionally involves mitigating the risk aspects on a bank’s 
trading book, the approaches implemented by the Accord to address this type of risk are 
expected to have little impact on a bank’s long - term residential lending practices, and so will 
not be described further for the context of thesis. 
Operational Risk 
The Bank for International Settlements (2011) defines operational risk as the risk of loss that 
results from inadequate or failed internal processes, systems, and people or from external 
events. Similar to market risk, the approach implemented by the Accord to address 
operational risk is expected to have little impact on a bank’s long - term residential lending 
practices, and so will not be further described for the context of this thesis. 
Capital Requirement as defined by Basel II 
The objective of the capital ratio is to calculate the minimum capital requirements that are 
required to address the risk components of credit, market, and operational risk. According to 
the Bank for International Settlements (2004), total capital as a percentage of RWA must not 
be lower than 8% with Tier 2 capital limited to 100% of Tier 1 capital. Tier 3 capital is similarly 
limited to 100% of Tier 1 capital. What constitutes these capital tiers is summarised below 
(Basel ii Compliance Professionals Association, n.d.): 
i. Tier 1 Capital: Also known as ‘core capital’ this tier of capital includes ordinary 
shares/common stock, disclosed reserves, and non-cumulative perpetual preferred 
stock. 
ii. Tier 2 Capital: Also known as ‘supplementary capital’ and includes undisclosed 
reserves, revaluation reserves, general loan-loss reserves, hybrid debt capital 
instruments, and subordinated term debt. 
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iii. Tier 3 Capital: this third tier of capital is employed at the discretion of national 
authorities for the purpose of meeting a proportion of market risks (subject to 
conditions) and includes short-term subordinated debt subject to certain conditions. 
 
Pillar 2 - Supervisory Review 
Pillar II of the Accord formed principles for a bank’s Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment 
Process which is intended to identify risks that are not easily recognizable to the bank (such 
as strategic, liquidity, and reputational risks), but that are material to the bank. Additionally, 
requirements were established to support banks’ capital adequacy by estimating economic 
capital to account for unforeseen losses (Agarwal and Ravitz, 2014). 
The second pillar of the Basel II Accord grants supervisory powers to regulators to inspect 
banks’ capital assessment policies and risk management systems. Additionally, regulators are 
given the authority to implement additional capital buffers if required (Roy et al., 2013). 
Essentially, the main objective of the second pillar is the emphasis that is placed on 
supervising the quality of a bank’s new systems for risk assessment (Griffith - Jones, 2007). 
 
Pillar 3 – Market Discipline 
The objective of Pillar 3 is to compliment the first two pillars of the Accord by forming a set 
of disclosure requirements that allow market participants to assess key pieces of information 
on capital, risk assessment processes, risk exposures, the scope of application, and hence the 
capital adequacy of the institution (Bank for International Settlements, 2004). Cadiou and 
Mars (2008) have a similar view and mention that the motive of Basel III is to improve market 
discipline through effective public disclosure, and that the pillar has increased the amount of 
information made publically available by banks. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Basel II 
The Basel II Accord had a number of advantages over the Basel I Accord according to Nayak 
(2013): 
i. The updated Basel II Accord is more risk sensitive. 
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ii. There is wider recognition of credit risk mitigation. 
iii. The discrepancy between regulatory capital and economic capital is reduced 
significantly due to the fact that the regulatory requirements will rely only on a bank’s 
own risk methods. 
Hassan Al-Tamimi (2008) found that the number one benefit of the Basel II Accord according 
to UAE bank employees with adequate Basel II knowledge was that of productive portfolio 
risk management. In other words, banks have an opportunity to become more profitable as 
less risk in the banking environment means greater profitability.  
Subsequent to the 2007 - 2008 global financial crisis, the Basel II Accord was on the receiving 
end of a wave of criticism. Some of the principle reproaches included the following: 
i. Pro-cyclicality: During periods of economic retraction, bank assets (loans in particular) 
are assigned higher risk-weightings leading to an increase in capital requirements. 
Simultaneous to this, capital provisions of the bank will begin to decline as loan losses 
start to accelerate. As a result of these factors, banks may be induced into decreasing 
lending advances whilst increase lending margins, thereby intensifying the pro-
cyclicality of banking behaviour. Conversely, during periods of economic expansion, 
lower risk weighting and excessive capital holdings by banks may lead to the expansion 
of credit volumes and the risk of a credit-led boom (Andersen, 2011). 
ii. Securitisation: According to Heffernan (2005), as quoted by (Neethling, 2014), the 
Basel II capital requirements provide an incentive for banks to shift credit risk off 
balance sheet through the securitisation (or pooling) of loans which are packaged and 
on-sold to institutional investors. These bundled loans are analysed by credit risk 
agencies who estimate the underlying risk of these loans and then assign an 
investment rating based on the riskiness of the underlying assets. Although the ratings 
agencies developed models to certify individual companies, a concern was that their 
models had not been tested for rating pooled assets where the specific intention of 
the originating bank was off balance sheet credit risk transfer (Neethling, 2014). 
iii. Developing Economies: the main criticism of Basel II with respect to emerging markets 
was that that the Basel Committee stated that its recommendations are for its G-10 
member states and not for developing economies. Although a set of standards called 
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Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision were created for developing 
economies, their extensiveness and relative anonymity in the policy making 
community have limited their impact upon international banking. As ratings agencies 
and large banks see the Basel Accords as the proper standard for banking regulation 
globally, critics allege that the joining of developing market bank policy into a less 
precise and publicised standard effectively causes the needs of emerging market 
financial sectors to be ignored (Balin, 2008). 
2.1.3 Basel III 
 
The sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007 – 2008, one of the largest financial collapses in recent 
memory, was the consequence of three prevailing issues. Firstly, banking sectors in many of 
the world’s economies had excessive leverage. Secondly, there was an erosion of the quality 
and level of the capital base amongst banks. And thirdly, banks held insufficient liquidity 
buffers (Bank for International Settlements, 2010b). Recognizing this, the BCBS introduced 
‘Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems’ and 
‘Basel III: International Framework for Liquidity Risk Management, Standards, and 
Monitoring’ (to be referred to collectively as Basel III) in December 2010. The revised Accord 
sought to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks that arise from economic and 
financial stress, and thus aimed to decrease the spill over from the financial sector into the 
real economy (Bank for International Settlements, 2010b). 
Chun et al. (2012) explain that Basel III primarily consists of two parts; a macro – prudential 
regulatory framework (oversight of the financial system as a whole) as well as a micro – 
prudential regulatory framework (oversight at firm level). The macro-prudential regulatory 
framework includes introducing a leverage ratio regulation, strengthening the regulation of 
systemically important banks, and establishing countercyclical buffers. According to Ilkova 
(2016), the macro-prudential framework is intended to enhance the ability of banking 
systems to absorb shocks that result from economic and financial stress. In contrast, the 
micro-prudential regulatory framework includes measures such as raising the quality and 
quantity of regulatory capital, supplementing the risk coverage of regulatory capital, 
introducing global liquidity standards, introducing a leverage ratio regulation, as well as 
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strengthening risk management, supervision, and disclosure (Chun et al., 2012). Van Dyk 
(2011) is of the opinion that the aim of micro prudential regulation is to increase the resilience 
of individual banking institutions during times of stress. 
Chun et al. (2012) state that the BCBS anticipates Basel III will boost the stability of the global 
banking system in the medium to long - term by providing incentives for banks to build up a 
liquidity and capital base. Further, the new regulation would restrain banks from taking 
excessive risks by incentivising them to move away from a business model of high risk high 
return to that of low risk and low return. As an added measure, the liquidity regulation would 
ensure that banks change their business model of borrowing low cost short term funds to 
invest in assets that are long - term and risky in nature; whilst the leverage ratio and 
countercyclical buffer would harness the excessive expansion of banks (and hence asset size) 
and thus temper fluctuations in credit supply (Chun et al., 2012). 
Basel III and its effect on banks’ Balance Sheets 
The Basel III framework impacts all components of a bank’s balance sheet. As a result, the 
structural changes which banks will need to pursue in order to abide by the Basel III Accord 
will have potential implications on long - term housing finance. Therefore, for the purpose of 
this thesis, understanding how these structural changes are going to impact long - term 
housing finance is imperative. In the words of Warnock and Warnock (2008, p. 239), “Housing 
is a major purchase requiring long-term financing, and the factors that are associated with 
well-functioning housing finance systems are those that enable the provision of long-term 
finance.” Taking note of this, a factor that is associated with a well-functioning housing system 
and that enables the provision of long-term housing finance is the credit system. 
Consequently, the banking sector, which is the main provider of credit in South Africa and the 
chief role player in ensuring that housing finance is provided, must be understood when 
attempting to grasp how Basel III will impact its operation and therefore the provision of 
housing finance. In light of this, the below chart provides an illustration of where the specific 





The sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007 – 2008 highlighted the fact that the global banking 
system suffered from a lack of high quality regulatory capital, and that the definition of capital 
varied across jurisdictions. Moreover, excessive on-and off-balance sheet leverage was built 
up among the banking sectors of many countries, which was accompanied by a gradual 
erosion of the quality and quantity of the capital base (Lee, 2014). As a response, the Basel III 
Accord incorporates an explicit focus on what constitutes capital; and thus ensures that 
common equity and retained earnings, regarded as the highest quality component of a bank’s 




KEY CHANGES TO THE ASSET SIDE KEY CHANGESS ON THE LIABILITY/CAPITAL SIDE
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
Counterparty Credit Risk
 ▪ Introduction of a long-term structural ratio to 
address liquidity mismatches
▪ Introduction of additional charges for 
counterparty credit exposures arising 
from banks' derivatives, repo and 
securities financing activities
Capital Adequacy Requirements
New Market risk and Securitisation 
Framework
 ▪ Increase of the minimum Common Equity Tier 1, 
Tier 1 and Total Capital Adequacy requirements
 ▪ Introduction of a stressed value-at-
Risk (VaR) and Risk capital requirement
Conservation/Countercyclical buffer
 ▪ Increase of capital requirements for re-
securitizations in both the banking and 
trading book
 ▪ Introduction of additional capital conservation 
(2.5%) and counter-cyclical (0-2.5%) buffers to 
withstand future stress periods
Liquidity Coverage Ratio Leverage Ratio
 ▪ Introduction of a global minimum 
short term liquidity standard, requiring 
banks to hold sufficient levels of high 
quality liquid assets
 ▪ Introduction of a non-risk based measure of capital 
structure (Minimum Tier 1 ratio of 3%/SARB 4%)
Capital Quality
 ▪ Requirement to form core capital predominately 
through common shares and retained earnings
Selective Origination on New Lending Capital Deductions
 ▪ International harmonization of capital deductions 
and prudential filter (e.g. limited recognition of 
investments in FIs)





Source:  Nedbank Basel III & IFRS 9 Investor Presentation November 2015 
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Resultantly, the Basel III Accord designates capital as follows (Bank for International 
Settlements, 2010b) : 
Basel III Capital Requirements 
Tier 1 Capital (‘Going – Concern’ Capital) 
• Common Equity Tier 1: Common Equity, Retained Earnings 
• Additional Tier 1: Perpetual bonds with call option of +5 years 
Tier 2 Capital (‘Gone – Concern’ Capital) 
• Long - term sub-ordinated loan with an original maturity of at least five years 
The limits and minimums for the above defined capital are subject to the following 
restrictions: 
1. Common Equity Tier 1 must be at least 4, 5% of RWA 
2. Tier 1 capital must be at least 6% of RWA 
3. Total capital (Tier 1 and Tier 2) must be at least 8% of RWA 
Tier 1 capital is capital that is able to absorb losses on a going concern basis i.e. capital that 
can be depleted without placing the bank into insolvency. Whereas Tier II capital can absorb 
losses on a gone – concern basis i.e. capital that can absorb losses in insolvency before 
depositors losing their money (Jinks et al., 2011). 
At face value, these amendments do not appear too radical a change when compared to Basel 
II. However, the composition and cost of the capital tiers has changed significantly which is 
particularly important to emphasis. Annexure A1 and A2 provide an illustration of the Basel 
III phase – in timelines, as well as an outline of the difference in capital holding requirements 
between the Basel II and Basel III Accords respectively.   
Capital Conservation Buffer 
In addition to the capital requirements as outlined above, a capital conservation buffer has 
been added as part of the Basel III Accord. This measure is intended to ensure that adequate 
capital buffers are build up by banks outside periods of economic stress so that these buffers 
can be drawn upon should losses be incurred (Bank for International Settlements, 2010b). 
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The capital conservation buffer has been set at 2.5%, and must be held in tangible common 
equity capital. This requirement is over and above the regulatory minimum of 8% (raising the 
total capital requirement to 10.5%), but is not included as part of the regulatory minimum.  
This buffer has been set so that if a bank’s capital holding falls into the ‘buffer’ zone (between 
8% and 10.5%) of capital during periods of economic stress, there are restrictions that are 
imposed on dividend distributions until the buffer is adequately restored.  To further offset 
the contraction of the buffer, banks have the ability to restrict discretionary payments to 
employees and other capital providers (Hannoun, 2010).  The objective of this buffer is to 
make sure that banks are capable of absorbing losses without breaching the minimum capital 
requirement of 8%, and can continue with business in a downturn without the need to 
deleverage (Roy et al., 2013). 
Countercyclical Buffer 
The Bank for International Settlements (2010b) maintain that there can be particularly large 
losses in the banking sector when a period of excessive credit growth is followed by an 
economic downturn.  These loses can undermine the banking sector and trigger a situation 
where problems in the banking sector can contribute towards a downturn in the real 
economy, which then feeds back into the financial system. Accordingly, the countercyclical 
buffer “aims to ensure that banking sector capital requirements take account of the macro – 
financial environment in which banks operate (Bank for International Settlements, 2010b, p. 
57).” This buffer is deployed at the discretion of national regulators and varies between 0% - 
2.5%. Typically, if the availability of credit is expanding faster than Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), capital requirements can be increased by regulators to preserve the national economy 
from excess credit growth (Roy et al., 2013). Drehmann and Gambacorta (2012) comment 
that Basel III has introduced the countercyclical buffer as a prudential tool with the principle 
objective of protecting the banking system from the escalation in system wide risk and quote 
the BCBS by mentioning that the buffer may have the side-benefit of restraining the build-up 






According to the Bank for International Settlements (2014) publication titled “Basel III 
Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements”, another contribution to the 2007-
2008 financial crisis was the build-up of excessive on and off balance sheet leverage in the 
banking system. Simply, the Bank for International Settlements (2014) defines the leverage 
ratio as a bank’s Tier 1 capital divided by the banks total exposures. Currently, the Basel 
committee has agreed to a minimum leverage ratio requirement of 3% which is intended to 
restrict the excessive build-up of leverage in the banking sector in order to avoid a 
deleveraging process that can threaten the economy and the broader financial system (Bank 
for International Settlements, 2014). The South African Reserve Bank has applied a more 
stringent ratio which has been set at 4%.  
Liquidity Measures 
Liquidity is defined simply as the ability to convert non – cash assets (i.e. listed securities, gold, 
etc.) into cash with relative ease. The Bank for International Settlements (2010b, p. 8) says 
that “strong capital requirements are a necessary condition for banking sector stability but by 
themselves are not sufficient. A strong liquidity base reinforced through robust supervisory 
standards is of equal importance.” The preceding Accords failed to incorporate a global 
liquidity standard amongst their content and the financial crisis revealed the importance of 
liquidity for the proper functioning of the global banking sector and financial markets. In order 
to address this shortfall, two liquidity standards have been included as part of the Basel III 
framework.  
Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
The first of these standards, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), has been established to 
support the short-term resilience of a banks liquidity risk profile by ensuring that there are 
adequate high quality liquid assets to endure an acute stress test scenario lasting for thirty 
days. An example of such a stress scenario would include a run-off of a proportion of retail 
deposits, a partial loss of wholesale funding capacity, or a partial loss of secured short term 
financing (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2011). Wu et al. (2013) state that the LCR is a measure 
of asset liquidity, and define the LCR as the stock of HQLA to the net cash outflows over a 30 
calendar day period under a severe liquidity stress condition, expressed as a ratio. 
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The Liquidity Coverage Ratio formula is as follows: 
 
In this instance, ‘High Quality Liquid Assets’ include those with a low credit and market risk, 
certainty of valuation, have a low correlation with risky assets, and are listed on recognized 
exchanges. Further, these assets would need to be in an active market with committed 
market makers, have low market concentration, and have flight to quality (Price Waterhouse 
Coopers, 2011). The tiers of assets are similar to the first pillar of the Basel III Accord in that 
there are two types of assets that are considered for the liquidity coverage ratio: Level 1 
Assets, as well as Level 2A Assets and Level 2B Assets. In brief, Level 1 Assets include 
instruments such as cash, central bank reserves, sovereign and Supra-national bonds assigned 
a 0% risk – weight under Basel II Standardized Approach (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2011). 
Whereas Level 2A Assets include sovereign and public sector bonds assigned a 20% or lower 
risk – weight under Basel II Standardized Approach, Corporate securities AA- or higher, and 
Covered Bonds rated AA- or higher (Davis, 2015). Each level of asset is assigned a ‘Weighting 
Factor’ with Level 1 assets receiving a 100% weighting, and Level 2B assets weighted between 
25% and 50%. Naturally, a higher weighting factor provides less of a ‘dilution’ of the asset 
value, and hence the overall calculated ratio. 
The LCR, as observed in the denominator of the above equation, considers the net cash 
outflows over the next 30 calendar days (i.e. cash inflows – cash outflows). Cash inflows 
include receipts from secured lending, as well as retail, commercial, and financial entity 
assets. In contrast, outflows include the depletion of cash deposits from sources such as retail 
and SME (small and medium enterprise) clients.  In a similar vein to how HQLA are treated, 
both cash outflows and cash inflows are allocated a run-off factor based on their ‘stickiness’ 
(or propensity to be withdrawn under a stress scenario), and assurance of receipt. When 
considering cash outflows for example, retail and SME deposits are at the bottom end of the 
scale with a 10% run-off factor, whilst wholesale deposits are at the opposite end of the 
spectrum with a 100% run-off factor.  
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Examining the LCR equation, it is evident that when high quality liquid assets with a higher 
weighting factor, cash outflows that enjoy a lower run-off factor, and cash inflows that are 
allocated a higher run-off factor are combined, a higher LCR is the result. To comply with the 
LCR, banks need to maintain on overall ratio of greater than or equal to 100%. Diagram A3 of 
the appendix provides a comprehensive overview of bank asset weightings, as well as the 
various cash inflow and cash outflow run-off factors. 
Net Stable Funding Ratio 
The second standard, known as the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), has a one year time 
horizon and aims to achieve long - term bank resilience by creating further incentives for 
banks to fund their activities with more consistent sources of funding on a continuing basis 
(Bank for International Settlements, 2010b). In essence, the NSFR will attempt to align the 
maturity of client deposits with asset maturities, and will “promote more medium and long – 
term funding of the assets and activities of banks .“ (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2011, p. 28) 
The Net Stable Funding Ratio is calculated as follows: 
 
 
The constituents of stable funding are profuse, and an exhaustive list of these items is 
unnecessary. However, in brief, an example of available stable funding and required stable 
funding as defined by Price Waterhouse Coopers (2011) is as follows: available stable funding 
includes a portion of non-maturity deposits and/or term deposits with a maturity of less than 
one year that would be expected to stay with the institution for an extended period in a stress 
event. Whereas required stable funding includes assets such as residential mortgages, and 
cash with maturity of less than one year. Similarly to the LCR, an available stable funding (ASF) 
factor varying between 0% and 100% is applied to the various funding sources, while a 
required stable funding (RSF) factor that also varies between 0% and 100% is applied to the 
several asset types. As expected, funding sources that attract a higher factor, and asset types 
that are assigned a lower factor, both result in a higher NSFR. To comply with the NSFR, banks 
need to maintain on overall ratio of greater than or equal to 100%. Diagram A4 of the 
Available Amount of Stable Funding
Required Amount of Stable Funding
>100%Net Stable Funding Ratio =
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appendix provides a comprehensive overview of both the required and the available stable 
funding factors. 
 
2.2 How the Impact of Basel III on the Macro Economy and Banks (ROE, 
balance sheets etc.) will Impact on the Provision of Housing Finance 
 
The 2007 – 2008 financial crisis appears to have changed the global financial landscape 
perpetually, with international regulations such as the Basel Accords moulding its operation.  
International regulators have specified a new set of liquidity and capital standards that have 
tightened the grip on global financial institutions, and ultimately dragged the world economy 
into an apprehensive state; adding to this unrest was the banking industry fuelling fears that 
the new stringent reforms may impede economic recovery (Abdel-Baki, 2012). However, 
Africa as a continent is fortunate to have survived the financial crisis fairly unscathed - largely 
owing to the resilience of its banking sector. 
Historically, more than 33% of African nations have imposed stricter capital requirements 
amongst their banks than what was stipulated by the Basel II Accord; and minimum liquid 
asset requirements as well as loan loss provisions exceeded those of advanced economies 
(Kasakende et al., 2012). Further, these countries have maintained a broader range of 
limitations on the composition of banks’ assets and liabilities and business activities. South 
Africa, for example, implemented a 9.5% total capital to RWA as opposed to the 8% as 
specified by the Basel II Accord. In terms of Basel III, South Africa has implemented a minimum 
total capital requirement of 9% which demonstrates South Africa’s stance on prudent banking 
regulation. As a result of these measures, one can contend that bank regulation is more robust 
than what prevails in developed economies (Kasakende et al., 2012). 
Banking in the current economic environment is an international business that witnesses 
cross border financial flows on a daily basis. This results in several cross border multinational 
banks holding a prominent share of the banking market of which Africa is no exception 
(Kasakende et al., 2012). Global reforms such as the Basel III Accord were developed in 
response to the financial crisis in advanced economies, with African bank regulators having 
little influence in modelling them. For that reason, it is important to understand whether the 
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Basel III Accord is likely to benefit the current economic (and banking) climate in South Africa, 
or be counterproductive to its progression. To answer this question, an investigation is 
required into how the financial framework amongst South Africa’s major banks will be 
influenced.  
There are a number of components on a bank’s balance sheet that are impacted by the Basel 
III regulation, as evidenced by the preceding review of the Basel Accords, which may influence 
the availability of credit to the market. The externalities that stem from balance sheet 
restructuring are likely to influence the banking sector’s profitability, business strategy, and 
hence the provision of credit. Resultantly, it is important to recognize which of the Basel 
components are likely to affect the availability of credit, in what ways, and why. As expected, 
certain components are anticipated to have a larger impact than others on bank lending. 
A review of the literature suggests a number of potential implications on the provision of 
finance due to the Basel III banking regulation. Accordingly, an account of these suggestions 
will be the ensuing aim of this chapter. In summary, matters to be covered include the macro 
- economic impact of Basel III, the effect on bank ROE, changes in lending rates, as well as the 
expected externalities resulting from specific Basel III components. 
2.2.1 Macro – Economic Impact of Basel III 
 
It is important to quantify whether the mandatory higher capital prerequisites as prescribed 
by the new Accord are expected to have a positive effect on economic output which in turn 
has an effect on the availability of credit to the economy. An increase in Real GDP (i.e. output) 
is usually as a result of either an increase in aggregate demand or a corresponding increase in 
aggregate supply. So, if the Basel III regulation were to result in the acceleration of growth of 
economic output, with aggregate demand as the main driver, by deduction one could expect 
the uptick in demand results from factors such as lower interest rates, higher asset prices, 
increased consumer confidence, and/or a more bullish banking sector (Pettinger, 2017). 
Interestingly, a study undertaken by Caggiano and Calice (2011) assessed the anticipated long 
– term economic costs and benefits of tighter capital ratios in terms of their effect on output. 
The analysis commenced by estimating the long-term benefit of higher capital holdings 
amongst African countries by whether there are any quantifiable gains in African GDP that 
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result from a reduced probability of future banking crises. Following this, the long-term 
estimated economic costs as a result of higher capital ratios were taken into consideration. 
The long - term economic costs were considered to be the equivalent of estimating the impact 
on the cost of bank credit as a higher cost of credit leads to lower levels of investment and 
consumption, which in turn has a negative effect on the level of output. In order to estimate 
these costs, the long-run relationship between lending spreads and capital buffers was 
analysed. Following this, the long-term relationship between lending spreads and GDP was 
examined. The study was then concluded by combing the results from both of the exercises 
to determine whether an increase in capital requirements does have a net long-term benefit 
on steady-state output. 
Resultantly, Caggiano and Calice (2011) concluded that tighter capital ratios do have marginal 
net benefits on the level of steady state output for a fairly wide range of capital levels. The 
study found that there are net output benefits for capital levels to increase by up to four 
percentage points above current level; thereafter, net benefits begin to decrease. Another 
noteworthy finding was that should capital ratios increase by more than nine percentage 
points, the marginal net benefits of higher capitalization become negative. On average, the 
African banking system holds capital buffers in excess of minimum requirements and findings 
of the paper suggest that African regulators should ensure that current capitalization levels 
amongst African banks are at least maintained (Caggiano and Calice, 2011). The authors of 
this paper have advised that due to data limitations, the cross country dimension of the study, 
the specific models used in the analysis, and other relevant factors, the results of this study 
are subject to considerable uncertainty. However, the authors do believe that the study does 
give a comprehensive synopsis of the long-term economic impact of higher capital 
requirements on African economies. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision found similar results to Caggiano and Calice 
(2011) in their long – term economic impact assessment report of stronger capital and 
liquidity requirements. The report considers the long - term economic costs and benefits of 
tighter liquidity and capital regulations by assessing their impact on economic output. 
According to the report, the benefits of a stronger financial system include a lower probability 
of banking crises (and the accompanying output loses), as well as a drop in the amplitude of 
fluctuations in output during non – crisis periods (Bank for International Settlements, 2010a). 
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While costs come in the form of a downward adjustment in the level of output (whilst leaving 
the trend rate of growth unaffected) when lending rates are increased. Although the empirical 
estimates of the benefit and costs are subject to uncertainty, the findings suggest that there 
is still considerable leeway to further tighten liquidity and capital requirements and still yield 
positive benefits (Bank for International Settlements, 2010a). 
Another study undertaken by Abascal et al. (2011) for the Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
when assessing the direct impact of the new financial regulation on emerging economies 
found that a 1% increase in both capital and liquidity reserves amongst developing countries 
generated a decrease in per capita GDP of between 0.04% and 0.15%. The report also found 
that should the capital/asset ratio increase by 20%, the corresponding effect would be a 
decrease in per capita GDP by 2.5%, and if the liquid reserves/assets ratio increased by 20% a 
0.5% decrease in per capita GDP could also be expected. 
In summary,  the financial intermediation function in the economy may be hampered by an 
increase in lending rates and a reduction in lending volumes leading to a slowdown in 
economic growth (QIS, 2010 as referred by (Chun et al., 2012).  However, economic growth 
over the medium to long - term may be promoted by lowering the costs of funding for capital 
and liquidity by reducing the risk of another financial crisis, and enhancing the stability of the 
overall banking industry (Chun et al., 2012).  Taking this into consideration, the literature then 
suggests that getting the regulatory balance right is key for economic prosperity. 
2.2.2 Basel III and its effect on bank balance sheets and ROE 
 
Closely related to the capital structure of a bank is the concept of Return on Equity (ROE), or 
put differently, the return on shareholders’ funds. ROE is one of the chief investment ratios 
that investors consider when analysing bank performance and as a result, banks generally try 
to maximise this ratio as much as possible. Alexandru and Romanescu (2008) endorse this 
statement by stating the ROE is the most significant indicator for bank profitability. 
ROE Example 
The concept of ROE, with respect to banking, is perhaps best understood by providing a 
practical example. As the main focus of this study deals with the provision of long - term 
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housing finance, a residential lending transaction is conceivably the most fitting manner in 
which to demonstrate how ROE is calculated. 
Suppose that an individual approaches a banking institution in order to raise finance to assist 
him/her with the purchase a residential property that has the following particulars (NB: The 
below example utilizes the ‘Standardized Approach’): 
Purchase Price: R5, 000,000 
Deposit: R1, 500,000 
Loan Facility: R3, 500,000 
Fee: R5, 250 (lending fees recognised over 3 years – i.e. R1, 750 per annum) 
Loan to Value (LTV): 70% 
Interest Rate: Prime – 1, 50% (9% - Prime currently at 10.5%) 
Assumed Transfer Price (interest rate bank pays on the borrowed funds): Prime – 2, 50% 
Nominal Gross Spread (2, 50% - 1, 50%): 1% 
 
First Year Income Generated: 
Lending Margin R35, 000 (R3, 500,000 X 1%) + Fee R1, 750 = R36, 750 Total Gross Income 
Assume a cost to income ratio of 75%. Therefore effectively 25% of Total Gross Income is seen 
as NPBT (Net Profit Before Tax) (R36, 750 X 25%) = R9, 188 
Risk weighting for residential property 60% ≤ LTV < 80% is 40%. Therefore the Risk Weighted 
Assets (RWA) for this transaction is R3, 500,000 X 40% = R1, 400,000. 
We then multiply the RWA by a capital charge of 8% (assumed). R1, 400, 000 X 8% = R112, 
000. This amount is re-invested at a rate of 7. 5% (assumed) providing income of R8, 400 
whilst invested. 
Therefore to calculate Return on Capital (ROC) we add the two income streams and divide by 
the capital amount.  
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R9, 188 + R8, 400 = R17, 588/R112, 000 = 15. 70% Return on Capital. 
 
ROE Generated in the First Year 
Effective Capital Charge: R112, 000 (Calculated Previously) 
Capital is comprised of 75% Equity, 15% Preference Shares, and 10% Subordinated Debt 
Therefore, the equity component of the capital held is R84, 000 (R112, 000 X 75%). Before 
ROE is calculated, the cost of debt and preference shares need to be subtracted. 
Assuming that the cost of debt (KD) is 2.21% (R112, 000 X 2.21% = R2, 475), the adjusted return 
after subtracting (KD) is R9 188 + R8, 400 – R2, 475 = R15, 113 and translates into a ROE of 17. 
99% (R15, 113/R84, 000).  
To increase ROE, banks can prompt this client to take – up additional ‘capital light’ banking 
products (products that do not require capital to be held) such as a bank account, a foreign 
exchange account, and an in-house insurance offering (if available) for example. 
The Bank Supervision Department (BSD) of the South African Reserve Bank (2014) has 
observed that across South African banks, ROE levels have decreased somewhat as a result of 
significant investment in IT systems and processes currently underway outlined as key factors. 
Statistically, the aggregate ROE levels amongst South Africa’s large banks decreased from 
18.7% in December 2012 to 16.34% in December 2013, which corresponds with the Basel III 
capital requirements that were adopted at the beginning of 2013 (South African Reserve 
Bank, 2014). However, the ROE has nearly improved to December 2012 levels with Nastas et 
al. (2017) reporting an aggregate ROE of 18.6% for the second half of 2016 amongst South 
Africa’s largest banks. This data suggests that the initial ‘shock’ of the new capital 
requirements has filtered through the system.  
Looking forward however, research undertaken by Abascal et al. (2011) estimates that ROE 
levels amongst emerging market banks is set to decrease by between five and six percent due 
to higher Core Tier 1 capital requirements as well as changes in capital deductions. Yadav et 
al. (2014) further this statement by mentioning that a combination of capital buffers, 
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increased capital requirements, as well as increased liquidity requirements are likely to 
impact the ROE for banks. 
Chun et al. (2012) explain that banks typically attempt to increase their capital adequacy 
ratios when capital levels fall below the new minimum capital requirements by either 
reducing RWA in the denominator, or alternatively by increasing regulatory capital in the 
numerator. Accordingly, RWA can be reduced by either scaling down the size of assets, or 
more commonly, by swapping high risk weighted assets with low risk weighted assets.  Chun 
et al. (2012), mirroring a research methodology that was originally undertaken by King (2010), 
used aggregate balance sheet and income statement data from various banks and across 
several countries (both developing and developed) to track how changes in a bank’s capital 
structure and asset composition will affect each component that contributes to a bank’s net 
income. Thus, by measuring the change in net income and shareholder’s equity associated 
with the regulatory changes, the researchers were able to calculate the increase in lending 
spreads required to achieve a given ROE. As described beforehand, banks fund their lending 
activities through the use of deposits, wholesale funding, and shareholders’ equity. One of 
the assumptions of the study was that any change in the composition of a bank’s capital 
structure, a likely scenario with the impending Basel III regulation, will see a reduction in 
liabilities (i.e. wholesale funding) offset by an equal increase in shareholders’ equity (and 
therefore an increase in the capital cost of the funding). Therefore, the higher ratio of RWA 
to total assets requires larger amounts of equity to be raised and thus a reduction in the 
requirement for wholesale funding. A scenario such as this typically results in the 
augmentation of lending spreads as the increase in the capital costs becomes higher than the 
increase in net income (Chun et al., 2012). The results of the study found that the ratio of risk 
weighted assets to total assets, the long - term interest rate on debt, and the relative size of 
loan to total assets were the major factors affecting lending spreads, all things being equal. 
Additionally, the estimation results revealed that for every percentage point increase in 
required regulatory capital, the required lending spreads to maintain ROE vary significantly 
across different banks and countries. Nonetheless, developing countries such as Brazil, China, 
and India, whom along with South Africa and Russia make up the BRICS nations, require an 
increase in lending rates between 13.2 bp and 23.1 bp for every percentage increase in 
required capital to ensure that ROE remains unchanged (Chun et al., 2012). 
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Observably, the Basel III Accord is anticipated to have implications on bank ROE as capital 
levels held by banks’ start shifting. As a result of the higher capital requirements, banks’ ROE 
numbers will be under pressure. Davis (2015) mentions that the higher capital requirements 
as stipulated by the Basel III Accord will offer increased loss absorption but will also be ROE 
dilutive. Therefore, to ensure that ROE levels are not compromised, a number of options are 
available including either increasing lending spreads on loan products, reducing retail rates 
on depositors funds, or decreasing company costs in the form of staff compensation for 
example (Norton Rose Fulbright, 2010). However, and more importantly for the context of 
this research, banks’ may also explore other ways of increasing ROE including boosting other 
income streams that are ‘capital light’ in nature as opposed to solely striving to grow their 
lending book. Evidently, this scenario would have implications on the provision of long – term 
lending with a reduction in lending facilities a potential consequence.  
2.2.3 Impact of Basel III on Bank Lending Rates 
 
According to a 2012 survey undertaken by the African Union for Housing Finance amongst its 
member nations, the below reasons were highlighted as key obstacles to obtaining residential 
mortgage finance (Chimutsa, 2013): 
- High interest rates 
- Access to long - term funds 
- Credit risk (no credit histories, no documented income, etc.) 
- Difficulties with proper registration 
- Cost and time of foreclosing properties 
- Burden of regulation (capital requirements, liquidity, etc.) 
The first three reasons on this list - high interest rates, access to long - term funds, and credit 
risk - are all items expected to be impacted by the Basel III regulation. One of the main 
contributors to the success of the housing market in South Africa is the availability of, and 
access to bank credit. Baily and Elliot (2013) explain that credit drives economic activity by 
enabling households to purchase homes without having to save the entire cost in advance. 
This account is especially relevant in emerging economies such as South Africa that suffer 
from poor household savings rates, and have a sizeable low income populace. Taking 
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cognizance of this, there are a number of variables that can influence the availability of, and 
access to bank credit; all of these variables can impact the various income segments of the 
housing market in different ways. One of these variables is a variation in lending rates - or put 
differently, at what interest rate consumers can borrow funds. 
Net – Stable Funding Ratio 
How South Africa and its banking system responds to the Basel III Accord and its requirements 
could be key in determining how bank lending will be affected. Nkosi (2013) in his joint 
congress address to the International Union for Housing Finance and the European Federation 
of Building Societies believes that Basel III and its liquidity requirements will have significant 
implications on home loans in South Africa due to the long - term nature of the product. The 
closing words of this statement automatically brings ones thoughts to the NSFR. 
Stable funding as defined by Marks and Nicolaides (2014, p. 56) is the “portion of those types 
and amounts of equity and liability financing expected to be reliable sources of funds over a 
one-year time horizon under conditions of extended stress.” In essence, as the name 
suggests, the NSFR is aimed at changing the way banks fund themselves, and urges banks to 
decrease the duration gap between assets and liabilities (Ilkova, 2016).  
The structural specifics of South Africa’s financial system will make the implementation of the 
NSFR exceedingly challenging for a number of reasons (Ilkova, 2016). Firstly, South Africa 
suffers from a lack of adequate household savings which make deposits a scarce resource. In 
fact, at 15.4% of GDP, South Africa has one of the worst savings rates in the world (Erasmus, 
2015).  And secondly, as a result of inadequate savings, banks rely on professional wholesale 
funding in order to achieve their funding needs (Ilkova, 2016). This situation is exasperated 
further by a bias towards contractual savings in the form of pension and provident funds as 
opposed to bank deposits (Davis, 2015).   
A report compiled by the South African Reserve Bank (2012) task team that was led by Dr. 
Daleen Smal echoed similar sentiments after its analysis of how the NSFR liquidity 
requirements may impact the South African economy (subsequent to this assessment the 
NSFR has been amended to be more aligned with the South African economy). The task team 
found that for South African banks to meet the NSFR requirements, the banks will need to 
make significant adjustments to their balance sheets. To begin, the funding structure of banks 
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will need to be lengthened in order to encourage a shift from short term funding to long - 
term funding - this could be achieved by increasing deposit rates on long - term deposits for 
example. Van Dyk (2011) shared this opinion by commenting that there could be a 
consequential impact on both pricing and margins as the liquidity ratios will coerce firms away 
from obtaining short term funding towards funding that is more long - term in nature. 
The second opinion of the task team was that the maturity of assets on a bank’s balance sheet 
may need to be shortened which would result in a preference for short loans, and the 
securitisation of long - term loans. The review was concluded by the task team indicating that 
if these two measure were not sufficient in achieving the required NSFR, banks may need to 
shrink their balance sheets and cut back on long - term lending (in the form of home loans for 
example). As a consequence, these balance sheet adjustments were expected to result in 
higher lending spreads as well as a reduction in the advancement of credit facilities, which 
would impact borrowers through rising funding costs and a reduction in the availability of 
credit in the real economy. This would in turn contribute towards a reduction in GDP as a 
result of lower consumption and investment expenditure levels amongst other variables.  
Due to the physiognomies of the South African financial market, the SARB has modified the 
treatment of funding that is received from corporate customers with a residual maturity of 
less than six months by applying an ASF (Available  Stable Funding) of 35% in contrast to the 
global standard of 0% (Ilkova, 2016). As a result, all of South Africa’s major banks are 
compliant with the NSFR as of end December 2016 (Nastas et al., 2017). 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
Allowing long – term assets to be financed while accommodating investors’ preferences for 
shorter term investments is commonly known as maturity transformation, and is one of the 
core functions of a bank (Segura and Suarez, 2016). This maturity ‘mis-match’ between short 
term deposits and long (er) term lending can place banks into a liquidity predicament as 
evidenced by the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007 – 2008. Cabral (2013) in his assessment 
of what triggered the 2007 – 2008 financial crisis argues that the high profits experienced by 
the banking sector prior to the financial crisis were achieved through a combination of 
balance sheet expansion, as well as the mounting term, default, and liquidity risk mismatches 
between assets and liabilities.  The end result was an increase in banks financial leverage as 
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they became less liquid, ultimately setting the conditions for a systemic banking crisis. In 
response to a lesson learnt from the financial crisis that capital requirements alone are not 
sufficient to sustaining a sound banking system, the BCBS introduced a global framework for 
liquidity management (Allen and Carletti (2008) as cited by Li (2017)). One of these 
instruments, the liquidity cover ratio, is used to ensure that banks hold enough high quality 
liquid assets to meet their liquidity needs for a period of 30 days under an acute liquidity 
stress scenario (Giordana and Schumacher, 2011). This piece of the newly introduced 
legislature has been described as “the most ‘painful’ piece of legislation to hit the sector, and 
will cost European Banks nearly 12 per cent of their 2012 earnings on average (JPMorgan as 
quoted by Bncini and Gauci (2011, p. 1)). Li (2017) reaffirms this statement by indicating that 
the implementation of the LCR can lead to a reduction in economic activity through the 
decrease in credit supply from the banking system. Dissection of this statement implies that 
the asset holding requirements of the LCR in the form of high quality liquid assets necessitates 
that banks need to hold assets on balance sheet that could otherwise be on-lent to induce 
further profitability. Davis (2015) in his assessment of the LCR and its optimisation for bank 
implementation highlights this point by stating that increasing the proportion of level 1 assets 
against level 2 assets will lead to an increase in the LCR but will come at a higher negative 
carry cost to the bank. Essentially, the high quality liquid assets that are held for regulatory 
purposes are not earning the yields that they could achieve elsewhere. Greef (2012) of the 
Global Ratings Co. ascertains that the biggest impact of the LCR will come in the form of 
increased pressure on bank profitability and ROE, with banks possibly having to increase their 
holding of liquid assets which will ultimately lead to a reduction in asset yields. As a result, 
customers may be subjected to increased pricing. 
Interpretation of the above literature, as well as dissection of the formula behind the 
calculation of the LCR, together suggest that there are both advantages and disadvantages to 
be had with the implementation of the LCR. One of the drawbacks arise from the changing 
liability and maturity structures of a banks deposit book. Essentially, longer deposit terms, 
blended with additional deposits from retail, SME, and non – financial corporates, result in a 
lower net outflow. Naturally, to achieve a scenario such as this, banks will have to ‘pay – up’ 
for the procurement of longer term deposits from the likes of retail and SME clients. As a 
result of the amplified cost of a banks funding base, higher interest rates will in all likelihood 
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be charged on lending advances. Nastas et al. (2017) mention that the introduction of the LCR 
has amplified competition in the market amongst banks to attract customer deposits that 
assist with meeting liquidity requirements, with increased rates being paid to customers in 
order to attract supplementary deposits. Evidently, as ‘input’ costs are increasing in the form 
of higher funding costs, banks will likely increase their lending margins in order to maintain 
profitability. Nastas et al. (2017) found that for the year ending 2016, spreads on long - term 
funding amongst South Africa’s four major banks remain elevated and still appear to be 
showing a high liquidity premium. 
Another drawback of the LCR stems from the fact that banks will be restricted to ‘on-lend’ 
their HQLA. Economic principles suggest that a reduction in the supply of a good or service is 
bound to lead to an increase in price, or in this case, an increase in interest rates. However, 
there are also advantages to be had. Hartlage (2012) says that maturity transformation 
benefits long-term borrowers by way of an increased supply of long - term loans, which also 
enhances the affordability of long-term loans.  
In a South African context, the current short-term liquidity position of the banks will be a tell-
tale sign as to what impact the full implementation of the LCR will have on the local lending 
environment. As at 31 December 2016, all of SA’s major banks were compliant with the 70% 
minimum phase in requirement. The phase in arrangement requires the LCR of all banks to 
increase by 10% annually until full implementation (100%) in 2019. Judging by the previous 
implementation performance of South African banks meeting these phase-in targets, there 
shouldn’t be any issues with banks being compliant within the required timeline. 
In  short, the literature suggests that borrowers of funds will have seen an increase in interest 
rate pricing on mortgage loans, and this may continue somewhat as banks complete the 
phase – in of full Basel III LCR compliance.  On the contrary, depositors of funds will benefit 
from increased interest rates offered on retail deposits as banks attempt to bolster their book 
of high quality liquid assets. 
The BCBS’s Quantitative Impact Study of 2010 as cited by Chun et al. (2012) suggests that the 
measures proposed by Basel III could result in both positive and negative effects on the 
banking industry, and in order to fulfil the Basel III requirements banks have to secure a 
considerable stock pile of capital and liquidity which could threaten the profitability of the 
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banking industry by increasing the cost of funding in the short term. Yadav et al. (2014) 
expand this statement by making mention of the fact that higher capital and liquidity 
requirements have an economic cost and therefore impact the borrowing costs of funds for 
banks, with loan rates having to factor in the higher cost of capital. Clearly, these statements 
both suggest that the escalating cost of bank funding will undoubtedly lead to an increase in 
lending rates with the borrower in the unfortunate position of having to accept more 
expensive borrowing costs. 
The affordability of housing in South Africa is a major challenge with 83, 4% of households 
earning less than R20, 000 per month (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2016). 
This coupled with the fact that building costs are rising faster than inflation means that 
housing affordability will be an enduring challenge for some time to come. In 2016 as outlined 
previously, it was estimated that the cheapest newly built house could be built for roughly 
ZAR350, 000 – leaving only 15% of the entire South African population able to afford the 
monthly repayments (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2016). Clearly, any 
increase in borrowing rates could invoke further distress in terms of affordability. 
Effect of Tighter Capital Requirements  
The major South African banks have traditionally held capital buffers in excess of the 
regulatory minimums set by the Basel Accords. According to a report rendered by Nastas et 
al. (2017), robust capital positions amongst South Africa’s major banks have contributed to a 
combined core Tier 1 capital ratio of 13.1%, and a collective total capital adequacy ratio of 
16% at the end of 2016 - well above the South African regulatory minimum capital 
requirement of 9.75%. The report specifies that a combination of resilient earnings, as well as 
the proactive management of RWA amongst the banks have been the main contributors to 
these healthy indictors. 
Chapter Conclusion 
Having summarizing the literature, it is evident that there will inevitably be implications on 
bank lending in South Africa through the introduction of Basel III. In brief, the Basel III Accord 
will implicate all components of a bank’s balance sheet including the asset side (in the form 
of new loans originated), the liability side (in the form of deposits), as well as the capital side 
(through higher capital holding costs). As a result, it is clear that the Basel III when compared 
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to the Basel II Accord is a great deal more ‘expansive’ in terms of risk coverage, and contains 
a variety of newly introduced measures that banks have not had to contend with previously. 
When combined with firmer capital requirements, these newly introduced Basel measures 
have been suggested as an impetus for banks to change the way housing finance is offered in 
its current guise. However, in exactly what manner housing finance is expected to change is 
up for debate. There is a gap in the literature pertaining to the anticipated tangible effects of 
the Basel III Accord on long - term housing finance in South Africa; which necessitates the 
need for further research on the topic in order to uncover exactly how housing finance in a 
South African context will be impacted, and what these implications signify for consumers.  
In an attempt to uncover some of the anticipated effects of the Basel III Accord on long - term 
housing finance in South Africa, this study employs a mixed method research technique 
utilizing a combination of qualitative and quantitative research approaches. The next chapter 
of this study offers a detailed description of the research methodology, and provides an 
explanation as to why these research methods where employed to achieve the research 













Chapter 3 - Research Methodology 
 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the research methodology used to attain the 
research objectives. This includes a discussion of the research philosophy, approach, 
methods, design, and analytical techniques that were used in the research. The chapter is 
concluded with an explanation as to why the study is valid and reliable. 
3.1 Research Philosophy 
 
There are many ways in which to gain knowledge, and each form of knowledge is valuable. 
However, as an individual researcher, the process in which to gain knowledge must be chosen 
(Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). Ontology as defined by Hudson and Ozanne (1988)  is the nature 
of reality, while epistemology can be described as the different forms of knowledge of that 
reality, and what nature of relationship exists between the inquirer and the inquired 
(Anderson, 2013). 
The research undertaken for this thesis adopts an interpretive approach and supports the 
notion that people make their own decisions which are not connected to the laws of science 
or nature (Patel, 2013). This study assumes that in the financial field, reality is mental and is 
perceived – there is no one real world that exists (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). The 
investigation of Basel III and its potential impact on long - term housing finance results in a 
variety of subjective responses from respondents. Effectively, different theories are 
constructed among different individuals. Each individual upholds their own personal belief 
systems that are moulded around social experiences and are subjective in nature. In other 
words, following an interpretist approach to research seeks to determine meanings, reasons, 
motives, and other subjective experiences that are time and context bound (Hudson and 
Ozanne, 1988).  Interpretivisim holds that the research and the research subjects interact with 
one another and create a cooperative inquiry (Reason and Rowen 1981; Wallendorf 1987) as 
referenced by (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). Furthermore, as social reality is founded upon an 
individual’s perceptions, in order to understand those perceptions, the individuals (the 
52 
 
inquired) must be involved in creating the research process by supplying information as well 
as guiding the research (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). 
Hudson and Ozanne (1988) state the research design of an interpretivist approach is 
continually evolving and is described as an emergent process, and researchers following this 
approach enter the research environment with some prior knowledge of the subject. 
However, this knowledge is insufficient for selecting a research design due to the shifting 
paradigms of perceived realities (Hudson and Ozanne, 1988). Considering this description, the 
research for this study began with a basic understanding of Basel III, and progressed towards 
a research design most suitable for the research objectives. Accordingly, this research can be 
assumed to have been an emergent process.  
3.1.1 Research Approach and Research Methods 
 
According to Dudovskiy (2016), an inductive research approach collects data with the 
intention of identifying themes and patterns, exploring a phenomenon, and creating a 
conceptual framework. While Gabriel (2013) says that an inductive approach will typically use 
research questions to limit the extent of the study, and is associated with the generation of 
new theory developed from the data. The research approach undertaken for the purposes of 
this study was inductive in nature and involved identifying patterns from data observations 
that resulted in a supposition (or theory) as to how Basel III may impact long - term housing 
finance in South Africa.  This research methodology was strategically aligned to the aims and 
objectives of the study and ultimately assisted in answering the research questions.  
This research utilized a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research methods to 
assist in obtaining the answers to the research questions. As Basel III is still in the 
implementation phase, and its implications still unidentified, the research was exploratory in 
nature. However, due to the fact that Basel III was developed as an ‘add-on’ to the 





3.1.2 Research Design 
 
i.) Field Research 
 
The goal of field research is to gather information that enhances your understanding of an 
issue or question and arranges those findings in a convincing and well-ordered document that 
proposes a new answer, insight, or solution (Colorado State University, n.d.). Using this 
description as a guideline, the qualitative aspect of this research was undertaken by obtaining 
opinions from business leaders and analysts that represent some of South Africa’s leading 
banks as to how they anticipate the Basel III Accord to effect the provision of long - term 
housing finance in South Africa. Due to the complexity of the Basel Accords, as well as the 
evolution of the regulations over the years, the aim of this section of the research was two-
fold. The first aim was to compliment my understanding of the objectives of the Basel Accords, 
whereas the second aim was to enhance my knowledge of the Basel III fundamentals in order 
to fully appreciate the feedback obtained from the interview respondents. Understanding the 
goals and mechanics of Basel then assisted with grasping how these regulations are likely to 
impact the provision of long - term housing finance in South Africa. 
The research was then bolstered by an in-depth revision of the Basel Accords and their 
defining features. As an added measure, references from government bodies including the 
Bank for International Settlements and the South African Reserve Bank, as well as works 
originating from leading industry experts were reviewed to solidifying my understanding of 
the Basel Accords and assist with obtaining solutions to the research questions. 
ii.) Statistical Analysis – Longitudinal (Time – Series) 
 
Cumming and Nel (2005) in their economic paper entitled “Capital Controls and the Lending 
Behaviour of South Africa Bank: Preliminary Findings on the Expected Impact of Basel II,” 
employed a research technique that produced a set of valuable results pertaining to the 
anticipated effects of Basel II on bank lending in South Africa. In this paper, a similar approach 
was used to make a preliminary assessment of the impact of Basel III on the banking sector 
and hence long - term housing finance. Cumming and Nel (2005) employed a time series data 
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analysis identifying trends in the aggregate of South African banks’ balance sheets over a 
defined time. The aims of their assignment were threefold: 
a. To determine in what way South African banks react to regulatory changes in capital 
requirements. 
b. To establish whether banks respond to capital requirement changes by varying 
qualifying capital, by changing risk-weighted assets, or by employing both of these 
strategies. 
c. Measure the changes to banks’ risk-weighted asset holdings, and assess whether 
these assets have become more or less ‘risky’ in recent years. 
Similar to the study undertaken by Cumming and Nel (2005), this research adopted objectives 
comparable to the above – mentioned with the exception of a few key modifications. The 
time-series analysis for this study incorporated elements specific to the Basel III Accord and 
covered between 2005 and 2017. Within this period, three ‘phases’ are identified: 
• Phase 1 (2005 – 2007): Pre Basel II until implementation of Basel II (‘Implementation 
Phase’) 
• Phase 2 (2008 – 2012): Post implementation of Basel II (‘Consistency Phase’) 
• Phase 3 (2013 – 2017): Build up to full Basel III implementation (‘Preparation Phase’) 
Phase 1 of the time – series is dubbed the ‘Implementation Phase’ and spans between 2005 
and 2007. This is considered a significant period for the purposes of this study as it tracks 
changes in bank specific data prior to the implementation of Basel II, leading up to the full 
implementation of Basel II on 1 January 2008. Phase 2 of the study period covers from 2008 
to 2012 and is termed the ‘Consistency Phase’ of Basel II due to the steadiness of the 
regulatory banking environment until the start of the ‘phase – in’ period of the Basel III Accord 
on 1 January 2013. The third phase of the study period, the ‘Preparation Phase’ falls between 
2013 and the beginning of 2017, and is defined by the phasing in of the Basel III Accord from 
1 January 2013. 
The goal of this section of the research was to monitor variations in particular bank variables 
that are specifically influenced by the Basel Accords. Based on the historical variations in these 
variables at significant stages over the three time phases, a prediction as to how Basel III may 
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affect long-term bank lending could be made. Key bank aggregate variables that were 
considered include: 
1. Capital Adequacy Ratios 
2. Risk – Weighted Assets 
3. Composition of Loan Extension 
4. Return on Equity 
3.1.3 Data Collection 
 
i. In – Depth Interviews 
The general interview guide approach is meant to ensure that the same consistent areas of 
information are collected from the interviewees, which provides more of a direct focus than 
the conversational interview approach and still permits a degree of adaptability and freedom 
in getting the information from the interviewee (Valenzuela and Shrivastava, 2002). Whereas 
utilising the standardized, open – ended interview approach, the same open – ended 
questions are asked to all interviewees which offers the benefit of a faster interview process 
as well as feedback from respondents that can be more easily compared and analysed 
(Valenzuela and Shrivastava, 2002). 
The data for the qualitative aspect of the research was collected by conducting in – depth 
interviews with business heads and analysts representing some of South Africa’s largest listed 
banks. Further, an interview with a senior representative from the Bank Supervision 
Department of the South African Reserve Bank was undertaken. Accordingly, consensus 
opinions from the private sector as well as the government sector were gathered. Interviews 
included discussions focussed on the various components of Basel III, and how banks’ 
anticipate Basel III to affect finance provision in South Africa (with specific reference to long - 
term housing finance).  Elements including return on equity, capital requirements, liquidity 
requirements, risk – weighted assets, the housing market, and the provision of housing 
finance were debated. 
Following a combination of the frameworks from these two interview approaches, all 
interviews conducted utilised a combination of the features offered by the general interview 
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guide approach, as well as the standard open ended approaches, and were semi – structured 
in nature. A variety of pre-determined open – ended questions were compiled for the 
interview process with each interviewee questioned on the same assembly of questions; a 
characteristic of the standardized open – ended interview approach.  A combination of the 
two interview processes allowed the added advantage of being able to explore specific areas 
of interest/questions that evolved from the pre-determined questions in more depth in order 
to gain further insight into the subject matter. 
ii. Time - Series Analysis 
The quantitative component of the study used a time – series data analysis with data obtained 
from the Annual Bank Supervision Department Reports of the South African Reserve Bank. 
This data was further supported by historical ‘BA 900 Returns’ for banking institutions as well 
as aggregated ‘DI and BA returns for the South African banking sector’. The bank specific 
variables that were mentioned previously (i.e. RWA, loan composition, capital adequacy 
ratios and ROE) were used as input values for the three time phases of the time – series 
analysis. 
3.1.4 Thematic Analysis 
 
Thematic analysis was used as a diagnostic tool to evaluate the responses that were gathered 
throughout the interview process. Braun and Clarke (2006) describe thematic analysis as a 
method for analysing, identifying, and reporting themes within data. A theme according to 
Braun and Clarke (2006) captures something important about the data in relation to the 
research question, and embodies a meaning or patterned response within the data set. 
Consistent with these descriptions, the research utilised a coding process to identify common 
themes and echoed opinions amongst respondents. The themes identified in this research 
capture something important in relation to the overall research questions (Braun and Clarke, 
2006). To this end, themes within the data were identified using an inductive coding approach 
as opposed to a theoretical procedure; coded data was not premised to fit within a pre-
existing coding frame (Braun and Clarke, 2006). Effectively, codes were derived from the data 
using the conventional content analysis approach (Hsiu-Fang and Shannon, 2008) as quoted 
by Ford (2014), and the coding process was descriptive in nature (Ford, 2014). Coding and 
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analysis of the data was predominantly at the semantic level with theme development 
reflecting the explicit content of the data (Braun et al., 2014) 
3.2  Reliability and Validity 
 
Reliability is described as the repeatability of findings while validity refers to the credibilty of 
the research findings (Sommer, 2006). 
3.2.1 Qualitative Reliability and Validity 
 
The issues of reliability and validity when undertaking qualitative research are can be broadly 
categorized into four areas of concern from which major sources of error can originate (Brink, 
1993): 
1. The researcher 
2. The subjects participating in the research 
3. The situation or social context 
4. The methods of data collection and analysis 
 All four of these risk areas concerning the validity and reliability of research were considered 
and mitigated.  One of the foremost reservations when undertaking a research report is that 
of researcher bias;  several writers advise researchers to spend a period of time in the 
research situation before the data collection starts (Brink, 1993). Following this 
recommendation, a significant period of time was spent getting acquainted with the Basel 
Accords and their effect on long - term lending through review of Basel specific resources. As 
an added measure, time was spent with industry insiders discussing the concepts of bank 
lending, the Basel Accords, and credit risk. 
The second concern outlined above is focused on the subjects participating in the interview, 
as respondents fail to always provide truthful information. To bypass this concern I ensured 
that all interviewees understood the exact nature of the research, and what the intention of 
the research was. As an added measure, the responses provided by the interviewee’s were 
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compared with the feedback obtained from all of the interviewees to ensure there was an 
element of consistency amongst responses.  
Fortunatelty, there were no concerns from a situational and social context. All interviews 
were conducted in a professional manner and on a ‘one-on-one’ basis. The interviews took 
place in an environment conducive to dialogue and knowledge sharing. All interviews were 
recorded to ensure that an accurate account of every interview was logged. 
The reliability and validity of a research assignment is contingent on the potential for 
succeeding researchers to reconstruct original strategies, and so an accurate account of the 
research design is essential (Brink, 1993). Therefore, to address concerns aimed at the data 
collection and analysis methods that were utilised, a number of directives were employed. To 
start, the research design as well as the methods of data collection have been precisely 
identified and thoroughly described to avoid any ambiguity or related concerns. Moreover, 
to prevent sampling bias, interviewees from both the private and public sectors were 
embraced to ensure that a well – rounded information set was realised. Additionally, all 
respondents were exceedingly well-versed in the context of the Basel Accords, and so could 
provide an informed account of the effects of Basel on long - term housing finance. Amongst 
the interviewees were business heads, a top tier analyst, as well as a respondent from the 
Bank Supervisory Department of the South African Reserve Bank. 
This research report has used a mixed – method approach with both quantitative and 
qualitative methods exercised. This form of triangulation in the context of this report has also 
assisted in increasing the validity of the results. The primary data that was collected for this 
research whilst adopting an interpretist approach can feasibly be associated with a high level 
of validity, as data obtained pursing this method tends to be trustworthy and honest 







3.2.2 Quantitative Reliability and Validity 
 
According to Heale and Twycross (2015), there are three different forms of validity measures, 
and a further three types of reliability measures that can be employed to critique quantitative 
research: 
Validity Types 
1. Content Validity - the degree to which a research tool (or instrument) accurately 
measures all aspects of a construct 
2. Criterion Validity - the degree to which a research instrument is related to other 
instruments that measure the same variables 
3. Construct Validity - the extent to which a research tool (or instrument) measures the 
intended construct 
Content validity questions whether the research instrument measures the entire domain 
relating to the research variable (Heale and Twycross, 2015). The research undertaken for this 
study utilised a time – series statistical analysis covering a period of twelve years measuring 
changes in key variables ‘unique’ to the Basel Accords such as risk weighted assets, loan, 
capital adequacy ratios, and loan types for example. With this is mind, it can be affirmed with 
confidence that an adequate dataset was used for the purposes of this research and covered 
all data pertaining to the subject matter. 
Criterion validity gauges whether a particular test (or study) accurately predicts the outcome 
of the study. This research employed a similar quantitative research technique that was used 
by both Neethling (2014), as well as Cumming and Nel (2005). Keeping this is mind, it can be 
argued that that quantitative aspect of this research was consistent with the techniques that 
were employed by previous researchers and so offers a strong degree of predictive validity.  
According to Shuttleworth (2009), construct validity defines how well an experiment 
measures up to its claims, and assesses whether the variable that is being tested is addressed 
by the experiment. Evidence of construct analysis for this study is demonstrated through the 
use of an analysis that relates directly to Basel III and the accompanying financial variables 
that bank regulations are most likley to influence.  
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Heale and Twycross (2015) outline the following attributes that contribute towards the 
reliability of a study: 
Reliability Attributes 
1. Homogeneity: The degree to which all the objects on a scale measure a particular 
construct. 
2. Stability: The consistency of results utilising an instrument with recurring testing. 
3. Equivalence: The consistency among responses between multiple users of an 
instrument or study. 
The first two attributes of reliability are commonly tested by using ‘item – to – total 
correlation’ and ‘test-retest’ respectively. The quantitative aspect of the research used 
objects that are characteristic to those influenced by the Basel Accords thereby proving 
homogeneity. Further, repeated testing of the study yielded identical results as the dataset 
that was employed for this component of the research was numerical and therefore ‘fixed’ 
by description. 
Equivalence in a quantitative study is detemined by using inter – rater reliability. As previously 
alluded to, this research employs a research technique that has been used by previous 
researchers and as a result, the attribute of equivalence is displayed. 
Chapter Conclusion 
The research for this thesis employs a combination of qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques utilising in – depth interviews, as well as a time – series statistical analysis to assist 
with solving the research questions. The study is underpinned by an interpretivist research 
approach and supports the notion that people make their own decisions and so gathered 
information is subjectively derived. The qualitative findings, as well as the quantitative results 
of the research are outlined in the succeeding chapter. The outcomes that have been 
identified are followed by a discussion around what the research suggests as to how long - 
term bank finance may be impacted. 
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Chapter 4 – Findings, Results, and Discussion 
 
In this chapter, the research data collection process, findings, and analysis will be discussed. 
The chapter is arranged in two parts. The first part describes the data collection methods that 
were used for the respective research methods. Thereafter, the qualitative and quantitative 
data that was collected is presented along with an illustration of the analysis process and the 
ensuing results. The second part of this chapter provides an analysis of the data, and offers 
some further insight as to what the outcomes of the analysis may mean for the provision of 
long - term housing finance. Thereafter, to conclude, what the results of the analysis reveal 
about the research questions are proposed. 
4.1 Field Research (In-depth Interviews) 
 
The qualitative component of this research was accomplished by conducting in-depth 
interviews with business heads and leading analysts employed within the banking sector. Due 
to the fact that the full effects of the Basel III Accord on the banking industry are still 
undetermined, the goal of these interviews was to gather opinions from industry experts as 
to how Basel III might impact banks, and what effect the Basel III Accord is likely to have on 
the provision of long - term housing finance. On conclusion of the interviews, it was decided 
that the most effective way to analyse the data was to identify recurring themes and shared 
opinions amongst the respondents. It is worth highlighting that qualitative research can often 
reveal information that is hard to discover by using only quantitative forms of research – this 
research was no different and yielded some valuable results. These will be discussed shortly. 
At this point, it is worth repeating that this research is underpinned by an interpretivist 
philosophical assumption and supports the concept that reality is observed by different 
individuals in different ways, and is subjective (Mitchell, 2016). Thus, the views expressed by 
respondents in this research are assumed to be defined by personal work experiences and 
are subjective in nature. Based on this premise, it is fair to assume that the sentiments 
obtained from experts and business leaders operating in the banking industry offer the 
greatest prospect of uncovering answers to the research questions. In line with these 
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suppositions, Braun and Clarke (2006) mention that thematic analysis can be a method that 
is used to reflect reality, and as a technique to unravel the surface of reality; effectively 
bringing a degree of reliability to the research outcome.  
Further, assumed realities identified in the data were the focus of the reportage, and so 
thematic analysis in the context of this study was approached in a realist manner (Braun et 
al., 2014).  
i.) Respondent Profiles 
Interviews undertaken for this research followed the ‘general interview guide approach’ 
(Valenzuela and Shrivastava, 2002) and were semi – structured by definition (Ritchie et al., 
2003). A range of pre-determined questions were derived for the interview proceedings. All 
questions were assembled to assist with reaching the research objectives, and to help answer 
the research questions. Due to the flexibility of the general interview guide approach, 
supplementary topics of similar interest could be reconnoitred to gather additional insight 
where necessary. 
A total of six interviewees (to be referred to as ‘respondents’) participated in the interview 
process. All of the respondents emanate from the banking sector, and are employed in both 
the public and private sectors respectively. Due to the intricacies of the Basel III Accord, as 
well as the knowledge required to have a meaningful debate, participating individuals were 
selected based on their banking credentials and understanding of the Basel III Accord.  
Accordingly, the profiles of the six respondents are illustrated below: 
 
Respondent Profile Industry 
'Respondent A' Head of Private Bank - South Africa JSE Listed Bank 
'Respondent B' Group Executive of Balance Sheet Management JSE Listed Bank 
'Respondent C' Global Chief Economist JSE Listed Bank 
'Respondent D' Credit Analyst - One of Top 3 Ranked Analysts Nationally JSE Listed Bank 
'Respondent E' Head of Private Bank - KZN JSE Listed Bank 
'Respondent F' Banking Supervision Department - Senior Management South African Reserve Bank 




ii.) Interview Questions 
The respondents were asked a total of fourteen open ended questions that were designed to 
extract full meaningful answers by leveraging the participants’ knowledge of Basel III, as well 
as the participants’ regulatory banking experience. Where necessary, respondents were 
probed with additional questions in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of the 
subject matter, or to spur further debate. The questions that were posed to the respondents, 
including a brief justification as to why these questions were asked follows: 
1. Compared to Basel I and Basel II, do you expect the implementation of Basel III to have a more 
significant impact on the provision of bank finance and in particular long - term housing 
finance? If so, how? 
The Basel regulatory measures have been evolving since the introduction of Basel I in 1988 
followed by the implementation of Basel II in 2008. Fortunately, South Africa was able to meet 
these regulations with aplomb. This question aims to uncover how the impact of the Basel III 
Accord will differ from that of the Basel I and Basel II Accords.  
 
2. South African banks, in general, have abided by the minimum capital requirements with ‘room 
to spare’ for the Basel I and Basel II Accords. Therefore, do you anticipate Basel III to have any 
dramatic implications on long - term housing finance at your bank as well as on the South 
Africa economy in general? 
The South African banking sector is particularly well-capitalised. So, if Basel III is expected to 
have an impact on the provision of housing finance, will it be a drastic effect? Is the regulation 
going to be something truly ‘felt’ by consumers looking to raise finance?  Will the effect on the 
housing market drip feed into the wider economy at all? Naturally, the housing market is a 
very important segment of the South African economy, so any dramatic implications are 
important to know. 
 
3. How will the consumer be most affected by the impending Basel III regulation (i.e. higher 
deposit requirements, increase in lending rates, etc.) 
How will the ‘man in the street’ be most affected by the Basel III regulation? I.e. are higher 
deposits on loans expected, are increased interest rates expected, are home loan terms 
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expected to change? Additionally, will credit supply towards long - term lending in the form of 
home loans be affected?  
 
4. With particular reference to mortgage loans, in what ways do you expect your bank as well 
as South African banks to react to regulatory changes in capital requirements as defined by 
the Basel III Accord? 
The intention behind this question was to understand how banks will adapt to the proposed 
changes. Can we expect a reduction in lending as a result of the ‘stiffer’ capital requirements 
leading to an increase in ‘capital light’ revenue lines for example (i.e. products that have no 
capital holding requirements such as FOREX revenue, bank fees, life insurance offerings, etc.)? 
 
5. What sector of the housing market (i.e. lower income, middle income, or higher income) do 
you anticipate to be impacted the most by Basel III? 
Broadly speaking, there are three levels in the housing market, each separated by level of 
earnings. Are one of these broad segments expected to be more effected by the Basel III 
regulation than the other? Why? 
 
6. Are banks likely to respond to changes in capital requirements by changing Risk Weighted 
Assets, by varying qualifying capital, or by both of these strategies? 
Banks can either increase their capital adequacy ratio by raising more capital relative to Risk 
– Weighted Assets (via retained earnings for example), or by decreasing Risk – Weighted 
Assets relative to capital. The latter option potentially signifying a slow – down in lending. If 
the second alternative is predicted, one could expect a decrease in lending, long - term housing 
finance included. 
 
7. How do you anticipate the new liquidity ratios introduced by Basel III (Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
and Net Stable Funding Ratio) as well as the Leverage Ratio affecting the provision of long - 
term housing finance? 
There has been increased emphasis on bank liquidity post the sub – prime mortgage crisis. 
Consequently, there are now two restraints impacting banks; capital requirements and 
liquidity requirements. How will these liquidity ratios effect bank finance? Over - leverage isn’t 
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a concern for South African banks however the leverage ratio was included to ensure that 
opinions regarding all ratios were covered. 
 
8. Banks can either follow the ‘Standardized Approach’ or alternatively the ‘Internal Ratings 
Based’ approach. Does the approach that is followed have any impact on the provision of long 
- term housing finance? If so, in what way? 
The intention of this question was that if Basel III was anticipated to affect long - term housing 
finance – would the use of the Advanced Internal Ratings Bases Approach by banks increase 
the propensity to lend money (as a result of potentially lower RWA than when using the 
standardised approach). 
 
9. Has there been a dramatic shift in bank focus in terms of prioritising increased ROE (mention 
USA example)? 
ROE is arguably the most scrutinized indicator of bank profitability, and the increased capital 
requirements courtesy of Basel III are expected to be ROE dilutionary. Therefore, how does a 
bank ‘juggle’ profitability (i.e. higher ROE) and regulatory requirements? What impact does a 
decreased/increased ROE have on bank lending? There are ways other than lending to 
increase a bank’s ROE (i.e. improvement in operational efficiency, increase of lending rates, 
etc.) – will the extension of finance suffer as a result of the ‘preference’ for other ROE 
enhancing techniques? 
 
10. If increasing ROE is a priority of the bank, how would the bank go about achieving this? For 
example, increasing profit margins on products (i.e. increasing lending interest rate spreads 
or bank fees for example), decreasing interest rates on retail deposits, etc. What do you 
foresee as the most likely scenario? 
Leading on from question nine, how will banks bolster their ROE’s and will this ultimately affect 
the provision of long - term housing finance? So, would a bank prioritize other ROE boosting 
methods and consequently ‘pull – back’ on residential asset exposures? 
 
11. There are two schools of thought that have been suggested as to what the implementation 
of Basel III may mean for long - term housing finance. The first school suggests that the 
increased capital requirements will negatively affect long - term housing finance, whereas the 
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second school of thought anticipates a shift in lending behaviour by the banks from ‘more – 
risky’ assets to ‘less-risky’ assets in the form of home loans. Which alternative do you agree 
with? 
The literature reveals the two schools of thought as mentioned in the above question 
regarding the provision of long - term housing finance. One school says long - term housing 
loans will be a less attractive asset option for banks, and the other school says housing loans 
are less risky (and so RWA requirement are lower) and as a result will be a preferred 
investment option. 
 
12. If the answer to the above questions agrees with the ‘second’ school of thought – will the 
Basel III regulations then assist in the provision of long - term housing finance or will it still be 
as ‘difficult’ to obtain ? 
Further to the justification offered for question eleven, will Basel III benefit the provision of 
long - term housing finance as this is considered a less risky asset? If so, will long - term housing 
finance be easier to obtain after the introduction of Basel III? 
 
13. What component of the Basel III Accord do you feel is most likely to affect long - term 
mortgage finance (i.e. capital holding requirements, capital conservation buffers, 
countercyclical buffer, liquidity ratios, etc.)? 
At this point, the interview would have covered all of the fundamentals of what Basel III is 
comprised of. Out of all of the Basel III components, what is expected to have the most 
pronounced effect on long - term housing finance?  And why? This question is to really gain 
another layer of understanding around the fundamentals of the Basel III components. 
 
14. Will the measures used to address market risk and operational risk have any bearing on bank 
lending? In particular long - term housing finance? 
This question was for my personal understanding of how the ‘other’ risk areas of operational 
and market risk tie into bank lending. If there was a strong link between these areas, how 




4.1.1 Thematic Analysis through Coding 
 
Based on the responses to the interview questions outlined above, common themes and 
shared opinions amongst the respondents were identified using thematic analysis. To assist 
with the identification and the subsequent categorization of themes, a manual coding process 
aided by NVivo (research software) was conducted across the data set using ‘topic’ coding to 
separate the data into the various categories based on the feedback received. Accordingly, a 
‘bottom up’ approach consistent with the inductive thematic analysis was employed (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006). 
Approximately twenty six themes emerged from the data, all of which were identified based 
on their ability to address the research questions, and to assist with the realisation of the 
research objectives. The themes, once identified, were then combined to form broader 
categories based on their similarities. Significant overlap between some of the themes was 
noted which further warranted the development of broader categories. Based on these 
categories, an analysis of the interconnections between the identified themes, and how the 
provision of long - term housing finance may be impacted was made possible. In other words, 
codes were identified capturing the essential elements of the interview responses and were 
combined to create a theme based on similarities. These themes were then compared 
amongst one another to form broader categories (of themes) also based on the similarities 
found between them (Ford, 2014). Once the data was suitably categorized, the dataset was 
then analysed to address the research questions and to realize the research objectives. 
As revealed in Diagram 4.1 below, there were originally twenty six themes that were 
identified during the interview process which were eventually combined to create six primary 
themes. All six of these themes along with their core underpinnings are related, and 
contribute towards the overarching goal of this research - to gauge the impact of the Basel III 
Accord on the provision of long - term housing finance. Broadly, these themes convey how 
Basel III may 1.) affect the provision of long - term housing finance 2.) impact the consumer 
who requires long-term housing finance 3.) change the way that long – term housing finance 




Diagram 4.1 – Themes Identified from the Interviews 
 
  Primary Themes and Sub - Themes 
   i. Financial Uncertainties 
1 Economic Concerns 
2 2008 Financial Crisis 
3 Affordability 
4 Household Savings 
  ii. Balance Sheet Considerations 
5 Impact on Balance Sheet 
6 Capital 
7 Leverage Ratio 
8 Liquidity Ratios 
9 Operational and Market Risk 
10 Opportunity Costs 
11 Bank Deposits 
  iii. Internal Objectives 
12 Bank Strategy 
13 Risk 
14 Standardized and IRB Approaches 
  iv. Housing Finance Considerations 
15 Credit Extension Implications 
16 Loan Term 
17 Loan to Value 
18 Cost of Lending (Lending Rates) 
19 Credit Supply 
  v. General Suppositions 
20 Impact on Households 
21 Current effects of Basel III 
22 Housing Market Impact 
23 Schools of Thought 
  vi. Bank Performance 
24 ROE/Bank Profitability 








Theme 1: Financial Uncertainties 
There are a number of lessons that banks have learnt following the 2008 global financial crisis 
that have changed the way bank lending is conducted today. This fact, coupled with consumer 
specific issues such as affordability constraints and household savings all form part of the 
economic concerns that will be discussed. 
Theme 2: Balance Sheet Considerations 
The second theme encapsulates all of the areas that surround what Basel III was designed to 
do – strengthen the balance sheets of global banks, and increase the risk coverage of the Basel 
regulation. Hence, there are certain measures that have been outlined by respondents that 
will impact the different components of a bank’s balance sheet which will be discussed. 
Further, what the overall impact of these measures is anticipated to be on the availability and 
affordability of finance will also be considered.  
Theme 3: Internal Objectives 
There are a number of reasons ‘other’ than bank regulation that may affect the provision of 
long - term housing finance according to respondents. Some of these reasons include bank 
strategy, and the risk appetite of individual banks. Also included in this theme is a discussion 
surrounding how the standardized, or internal rating based approaches that a bank adopts 
can affect bank lending. 
Theme 4: Housing Finance Considerations 
The Basel III regulation is suggested to have an impact on the numerous facets of a lending 
transaction including the term of the loan, the borrowing rate, as well as the propensity of 
banks to extend a particular type of credit. Included in this theme is a discussion focused on 
whether the loan to value requirements on long - term lending transactions has shifted as a 
result of Basel III. 
Theme 5: General Suppositions 
The fifth theme identified includes opinions from respondents predominantly centred around 
how households (or more directly the consumer) have already been implicated by the phasing 
in of the Basel III requirements, and what sectors of the housing market (i.e. lower income, 
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middle income, or higher income) are most likely to be effected by the implementation of Basel 
III. Included in this theme are opinions from respondents that address question eleven of the 
interviews (the ‘two schools of thought’ surrounding Basel III and its impact on consumers). 
Theme 6: Bank Performance 
Theme six captures all of the responses that assist in answering one of the research questions 
initially outlined in chapter one.  Aspects including bank profitability, ROE, and the associated 
spin-offs on long - term housing finance are included as part of this theme. The discussion 
concludes with a diagram that provides insight into which components of the Basel III Accord 
are likely to impact ROE, and what this impact on ROE means for the availability and 
affordability of long - term housing finance. 
4.1.2 Theme Analysis 
 
Before embarking on an analysis of the themes, it is important to develop an understanding 
of how the participating respondents perceive the intentions of the Basel III framework, and 
how these objectives have evolved from the prevailing Basel I and Basel II Accords. Once 
understood, the links that connect these themes and their accompanying underpinnings are 
easily identified. 
The subject of Basel III and the matter of risk mitigation appear to go hand in hand when 
contemplating the feedback received from respondents. One of the respondents explained 
how the global financial crisis had exposed three major areas of concern amongst global 
banks. Firstly, banks were incorrectly measuring risk and that the coverage of risk 
measurement was not wide enough. Secondly, banks had an inadequate ‘capital stack’ in that 
there was not enough loss absorbing capital in the event of an organisation having issues. 
Thirdly, there was a liquidity issue amongst banks, with banks not holding enough High Quality 
Liquid Assets (HQLA) to support an organisation’s cash outflows in the event of distress. To 
account for these disparities, the revised Basel framework has expanded its risk agenda 
significantly. As a result, the measurement of operational, market, and credit risk through the 
use of risk – weighted assets has increased significantly. Seemingly, it is as a result of the 
strategies employed to address these three areas of concern that long - term housing finance 
in South Africa may be impacted upon. 
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Keeping this in mind, it must be remembered that banks are in the business of helping 
individuals with their funding needs. Respondent B sums it up by saying that banks “create a 
mechanism to bring two parties together through the taking of deposits, and the extension 
of credit.” “The role of the bank is to transform short dated liquidity into long dated lending.” 
Simple as they may appear, there is a great deal of depth behind these statements. Effectively, 
Basel III is expected to impact exactly what banks were created to do; the taking of deposits 
and the extension of credit. As well as impacting these functionalities, the obligatory capital 
holdings of the bank are destined for a shake up as well. Based on this feedback, it is clear 
that all components of the banks’ balance sheet will be influenced.  
The impact that Basel III is likely to have on the various components of a bank’s balance sheet, 
and what these effects mean for the provision of long - term housing finance is important to 
understand. Nevertheless, two things are ultimately effected – the availability and the 
affordability of long - term housing finance.  
Theme 1: Balance Sheet Considerations 
 
The Basel III Accord has, and will have, a direct impact on all major components of a bank’s 
balance sheet according to the majority of respondents. Judging by the feedback obtained 
from respondents, a banks ‘costs of capital’ (the cost or ‘expense’ of the capital that is held in 
relation to RWA) as well as ‘cost of funding’ (the cost or ‘expense’ of raising funds that are 
advanced in the form of loans) are destined to rise. Dissecting these statements further, it is 
apparent that the asset (loans), liabilities (deposits), as well as the capital structures of banks 
will be impacted. 
Capital Implications 
The phrase ‘cost of capital’ has been synonymous with the Basel frameworks for years. South 
African banks have blamed the slow but apparent increases in interest rates, as well as the 
progressively more conservative lending practices on the Basel Accords and the increasing 
‘cost of capital.’ 
A banks ‘cost of capital’, as the name suggests, relates directly to the cost of the capital that 
is held against a banks RWA’s. As described in the chapter two literature review, Basel III 
72 
 
denotes that banks are required to hold a minimum of 6% Tier 1 capital (Common Equity Tier 
1 capital must comprise 4.5% of this), and a further 2% in Tier 2 capital, for a total capital 
compliment of 8%.  
Global banks have to abide by the newly proposed Basel III capital standards by 1 January 
2019. Once compliant with the revised capital requirements, the pressing question that arises 
is whether a banks ‘cost of capital’ is going to increase further than when compared to the 
Basel II Accord. If so, is the additional increase in the cost of capital going to result in higher 
interest rates on long - term lending transactions for consumers? The answer to these 
questions was unanimous amongst respondents.    
All respondents were of the opinion that Basel III will ultimately result in the escalation of a 
bank’s capital costs. A venerable explanation was offered by respondent B to make sense of 
how a banks cost of capital was due to rise. The respondent described how the revised Basel 
standard has specified a new composition of capital to be held as part of a bank’s capital stack 
(to be held against Risk Weighted Assets), that includes so called ‘new style’ Alternative Tier 
1 capital as well as ‘new style’ Tier 2 capital. These revised capital frameworks were created 
with the intention of remedying two evident flaws that existed within a bank’s capital stack 
prior to the introduction of Basel III.  The first of these flaws was the fact that additional Tier 
1 capital, as well as Tier 2 capital, could not be triggered to absorb bank losses (even in the 
event of a government bail-out) unless a bank formally went into liquidation. To address this 
issue, Basel III has introduced two clauses, of which either can be triggered, if a bank has 
reached the point of ‘non – viability’ as determined by SARS. ‘Clause A’ states that additional 
Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital can be converted into ordinary share capital in order to absorb 
loses, while ‘clause B’ affirms that additional Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital can be written – 
off in order to absorb loses. 
Respondent B continued by adding that the second limitation of a bank’s capital framework 
pre – Basel III was that there was not enough loss absorbent capital included within a bank’s 
capital stack in order to absorb bank losses. To address this shortcoming, a revised debt 
structure has been implemented. According to Basel III, additional Tier 1 capital debt 
instruments need to be perpetual in nature (no maturity date), and have a call option after 5 
years plus one day, subject to the consent of the SARB.  Furthermore, coupon payments are 
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done on a discretionary basis and are not compulsory. Tier 2 debt capital on the other hand 
is callable after 5 years, and is differentiated by a non – discretionary guaranteed coupon 
payment.  
Due to the changes of the underlying rudiments that comprise these new capital tiers, 
investors are going to demand a higher rate of return for their investments into these 
securities as a result of the amplified risk. As a consequence, the cost of maintaining the 
bank’s capital stack will be amplified, with the increase in cost having to be borne by either 
the shareholders (through lower returns on their investments) or by the borrowers of funds 
(through higher interest rates on lending transactions).  This respondent in particular believes 
this cost will be equally borne between shareholders and borrowers, suggesting that interest 
rates on lending transactions are bound to increase as a result of the increasing capital costs 
that banks will need to endure.  In a similar vein, another respondent pointed out that a bank’s 
capital holding cost will be implicated as a result of the increase in Common Equity Tier 1 
capital requirements – effectively confirming the remarks of Respondent B. Common Equity 
Tier 1 capital is regarded as the best ‘quality’ capital a bank can hold. However, it also holds 
the title of the most expensive form of capital, with shareholders having a direct claim on 
bank earnings. 
In summary, as Respondent B alluded to, the additional capital cost to banks courtesy of the 
Basel III Accord will need to be absorbed somewhere, with consumers of bank credit likely to 
absorb some of these costs in the form of higher interest rates on lending advances. 
Fortunately, South African banks are particularly well capitalised when compared to other 
countries, with South Africa’s major banks already compliant with the new Basel III capital 
standards. As a result, there is no immediate ‘pressure’ on South African banks to conform to 
the new capital standards of the Basel III Accord. For this reason, evidence from respondents 
suggests that South African banks will still be lending money due to their strong capital 
holdings (as opposed to decreasing their RWA’s relative to their capital reserves, in order to 
grow their capital adequacy ratio). However, these borrowed funds will likely come at a 





Asset and Liability Implications 
Chapter two of this thesis described how a large component of a bank’s lending activities are 
funded through the receipt of cash deposits from individual and institutional investors alike -  
with these deposits comprising a portion of a banks liabilities. The Basel III Accord has 
introduced a measure that will directly implicate the liability side (as well as other parts) of a 
bank’s balance sheet. Or more precisely, it’s funding base. The newly commissioned Net 
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) aims to decrease the mis-match between short dated funding in 
the form of deposits, and long dated credit extension; impacting both the asset and liability 
side of the balance sheet. As a result, banks that are aspiring to grow their long – term 
residential lending book, will need support in the form of longer term stable funding as well.  
Poor household savings rates in South Africa were mentioned by two respondents as an 
obstacle for South African banks aiming to meet the NSFR deadline. As a result, there will be 
an increase in competition among banks to attract the limited supply of depositors. Five of 
the respondents remarked that the increase in competition for NSFR ‘friendly’ funds will 
induce banks to increase interest rates on cash deposits in order to entice depositors along 
with their valuable funds. Explicably, the unwanted consequence of this comportment is an 
increase in the cost of their funding base (and therefore a likely increase in borrowing rates 
to offset the escalating cost of the funding base). Similarly to the increasing cost of a bank’s 
capital constituents, the cost of a banks funding base it set to increase as well.  
Evaluating the feedback from respondents, it is evident how the NSFR is going to encourage 
banks to reduce the duration of their loans, whilst increasing interest rates on their lending 
facilities. In short, the NSFR is expected to lead to an increase in the cost of funding for banks 
(through higher deposit rates) in order to facilitate their long - term lending activities. 
Therefore, to balance the mis-match in funding which the NSFR is trying to align, there can 
only be two alternatives. Either, banks need to procure more long - term deposits that will 
ultimately lead to an increase in their cost of their funding base. Or alternatively, there needs 
to be a reduction in the term of their lending facilities. In fact, the majority of respondents 
were of the opinion that mortgage loan durations may be reduced in length with one 
respondent commenting “it (the NSFR) encourages the banks to fund themselves long-term 
and discourages long-term lending at the same time.” Another respondent was of the view 
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that long - term mortgage finance may be compromised in favour of short term lending 
facilities. Respondent F says, “instead of doing further advances on mortgages, banks might 
rather opt for shorter term personal loans because you would rather do shorter term 
financing based on the liquidity impacts.” Reviewing the subsequent quantitative aspect of 
this research suggests that banks do seem to be shifting their lending practices towards assets 
that are shorter in duration. These findings will be discussed in the following section. 
The newly introduced Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) aims to address short – term liquidity 
concerns and impacts the asset and liability side of a bank’s balance sheet. When questioned 
whether the LCR was likely to have an effect on long - term housing finance, the overwhelming 
majority of respondents stated that it was not a cause for concern for long - term lending 
transactions. Respondent C explained that the LCR is a short term liquidity measure and 
ensures that banks have “enough liquidity to cover a run on the bank, so I cannot see that it 
really ties into your long - term mortgage loan.” However, one respondent sees the LCR in 
another light and indicated that the introduction of the LCR will see the cost of capital increase 
– the opportunity cost of capital. By definition, the liquidity coverage ratio specifies a 
particular amount of High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) to be held as a buffer to mitigate 
against short term liquidity risks. As a result, “the LCR has the implication in terms of the 
consumption of liquidity which leaves lower liquidity to deploy into long dated lending” as 
stated by one of the respondents. Simply, due to the low yields on traditional high quality 
liquid assets, banks will be subjected to lower returns for every Rand that requires to be 
invested into these asset types, further increasing their overall cost of capital. A noteworthy 
point raised. 
Theme 2: Financial Uncertainties 
Basel III is a regulatory measure that is intended to promote banking soundness, not foster 
economic growth according to one of the respondents. Considering this, Basel III has a 
number of potential implications that may result in the increase in the stability of the banking 
sector, but may also stifle economic growth through the tightening of bank lending. 
The decision to extend finance, as observed by the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, can 
be affected by the current economic climate, as opposed to bank regulations, according to 
half of the interview respondents. These respondents remarked that economic cycles, as 
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opposed to bank regulation, are capable of influencing residential housing finance. 
Respondent C substantiates this by saying, “sometimes if we are going through a negative 
cycle for property and regulations kick in, you then feel that the regulations had something 
to do with it. Property by and large in South Africa has been very effected by the economic 
growth and the property cycle itself.” 
Supporting this statement, a number of respondents remarked that the sub-prime mortgage 
crisis of 2008 has prompted authorities to include measures in the Basel III framework that 
are far more intricate, and less flexible when compared to the two prevailing Basel Accords. 
Respondent D remarks that “Basel III is much more detailed and prescriptive with regard to 
the treatment of various items on the balance sheet. Because it’s so much more detailed, 
these prescriptions that have been put in place, very little is allowed for interpretation, 
management judgement, and risk management based on the circumstances of an individual 
bank or individual country.” 
Closely related to the topic of economics is that of consumer affordability, a factor that the 
majority of respondents outlined could impact long - term housing finance as opposed to 
Basel III in the strict sense. A number of issues outside of the regulatory environment impact 
a consumer’s affordability including aspects such as taxes (direct and indirect), interest rate 
cycles, and inflation levels. Accordingly, fluctuations in these variables can have a prolific 
impact on the affordability of bank finance for some individuals. Evidently, certain sectors of 
the market are anticipated to be effected more than others. This aspect will be discussed in a 
later theme. 
Theme 3: Internal Objectives 
The majority of respondents mentioned that there are reasons independent of the Basel III 
Accord that may impact the provision of long - term housing finance in South Africa.  
Two of the reasons that were immediately apparent include bank strategy, as well as the risk 
appetite of banks. Banks often have varying investment objectives and investment goals when 
compared to one another. As a consequence, this results in individual banks investing more 
heavily into an asset class that they deem to be more profitable than another. Respondent E, 
when discussing his own bank’s investment objectives, articulates this by saying, “I think we 
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have actively sought to decrease our commercial property component; well some of that is 
driven by rating agency views, so it is not just regulatory.” Conversely, Respondent B’s bank is 
very bullish on commercial property lending, and describes how the ‘asset tilt’ of their lending 
book is weighted more towards commercial property lending. As demonstrated, certain banks 
may see more value in long –term housing finance than others, and thus will endeavour to 
invest in these types of assets. Based on this feedback, the decision by a bank to invest in a 
particular assets class, like residential housing finance for example, is not always the result of 
regulatory measures such as the Basel framework, but can be the outcome of a strategic 
business decision. 
Closely aligned to the area of bank strategy is the subject of credit risk, and the calculation of 
Risk – Weighting Assets (RWA). Interestingly, household mortgage loans have often been 
referred to as a ‘less – risky’ form of investment for banks as suggested by some sources in 
the literature review. As a result, banks would pursue these investments due to their 
‘conservative’ qualities. Beguilingly, according to two of the respondents, home loans are not 
always considered a less – risky investment, with other asset types seemingly preferred. 
Naturally, this feedback does not bode well for the provision of long - term housing finance.  
However, there is past evidence that suggests banks do invest in home loan assets during 
times of regulatory reform as a result of their lower risk weightings as found by Cumming and 
Nel (2005). 
Based on the discussed feedback of this theme, it is fairly safe to say that developments such 
as these may impact the availability of long - term funding. However, the affordability of 
finance is not expected to be impacted in any way.  
Theme 4: Housing Finance Considerations 
The inquiry in to what sector of the housing market was most likely to be effected by the Basel 
III Accord received a somewhat mixed response among respondents. Some respondents 
indicated that the lower sector of the income market was most likely to be affected while 
others indicated that the middle income market was likely to be affected most. Further 
discussion on this matter prompted the comment that “it depends what is considered low 
income and what is considered high income” by one of the respondents. For the purposes of 
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this research, a low income earner is an individual with transparent monthly earnings actively 
seeking to purchase an urban residential property that is priced around roughly R300, 000 - 
R350, 000. Taking this into account, the large majority of respondents then perceived the 
lower income market to be most affected. The justification offered by respondents was that 
of affordability constraints. Discernibly, the lower income consumers are particularly sensitive 
to variations in lending rates, primarily due to low disposable income levels. Therefore, any 
increase in their debt instalments can be the difference between making payment, and not 
making payment. Analysing the feedback cited above suggests that Basel III is expected by 
respondents to result in higher lending rates and consequently higher debt instalments 
(hence the majority consensus that the lower income earner will be most impacted by the 
Basel III Accord). An added consideration that respondent B alluded to was that access to 
housing finance could be prohibitive for low income earners should banks necessitate any 
deposit requirements on long - term housing finance transactions. 
Contrary to some of the other responses amongst respondents, one respondent did remark 
that the higher end consumer will be most affected by the Basel III Accord, as competition 
among banks to finance properties for these individuals will become more competitive 
resulting in lower interest rates for these types of clients. Evidently, high income earning low-
risk clients earn a lower risk weighting according to the Internal Ratings Based Approach for 
their borrowing activities; potentially leading to more price competition amongst the banks. 
This response appears to be more driven by what the impact may be on the respondents 
banking business as opposed to an impact against the different tiers of income earners. Based 
on the above, the majority consensus among the respondents leans towards the lower end 
of the housing market in terms of Basel III impact, with the middle and high income levels 
potentially feeling the effects of the Accord to a lesser extent. 
Another interesting dimension relating to the increased capital requirements of Basel III is 
whether banks will look to increase their capital adequacy ratios through the organic 
generation of profits and retained earnings, or whether banks are more likely to alter their 
RWA’s to ensure that their current capital holdings become a bigger ratio of RWA. When the 
options were presented to the respondents, the majority of respondents indicated that banks 
would employ both methods to ensure compliance with the new Basel III regulatory ratios. 
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However, out of these two options, a variation in RWA seemed to be the stronger possibility. 
Respondent D ratifies this by saying, the “ideal sort of circumstances under Basel III is you 
have as little as possible in risk weighted assets so you don’t have to work with capital.” 
Consideration of these responses suggest that the predominant approach to meeting and 
maintaining capital targets will be through a variation in RWA. The use of this alternative could 
benefit long - term housing finance for consumers that enjoy IRBA friendly profiles. However, 
poorly rated consumers as per banks’ IRBA models are likely to suffer as a consequence.  
Theme 5: General Suppositions 
A noteworthy variable identified amongst respondents that has a significant impact on the 
extension of credit is the aspect of loan to value (LTV) on housing transactions. Irrefutably, 
any change in this metric as a result of Basel III will have a direct impact on consumer 
affordability, and consequently the extension of credit. As previously mentioned by 
respondent B, enforcing lower loan to value requirements on consumer housing loans by 
banks can lead to the exclusion of a large percentage of potential home buyers who don’t 
have the means of raising the required deposit. Therefore, understanding whether Basel III 
will have any further implications on loan to value levels compared to the previous Basel 
Accords is an aspect that needs to be understood. 
There were mixed responses from respondents as to whether the LTV on a lending transaction 
was likely to be significantly impacted by the full implementation of Basel III.  Respondent F 
acknowledged that LTV’s on lending transactions had shifted, but believed the shift was a 
result of the lessons learnt from the 2008 financial crisis, as opposed to the Basel regulations. 
In essence, this respondent was alluding to the fact that banks are demanding larger deposits 
on property lending transactions to de-risk property loans. However, all other respondents 
outlined the fact that property lending transactions with a lower LTV translate into a lower 
risk weighting (and so lower capital holding), and therefore increased profitability. This 
dimension of lower RWA for lower LTV transactions is consistent with both the Basel II and 
Basel III Accords. As a result, it can be argued that although LTV is considered for RWA 
reasons, the Basel III regulation is not likely to significantly change the way that banks 
currently consider the LTV on long - term lending transactions. 
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Interpreting this, the feedback suggests that Basel III is not going to significantly impact the 
required LTV on long - term lending transactions. Rather, the appetite for long - term 
residential lending transactions with a high LTV will be decided upon based on the bank’s risk 
appetite, and the profile of the individual client (or borrower). 
Theme 6 – Bank Performance 
Return on Equity (ROE) is arguable the most scrutinized indictor of bank profitability. For 
shareholders, it appears to be the most scrutinized indicator of bank profitability. The 
relationship between Basel III and ROE is an interesting one, with the increased capital 
requirements of the former destined to put downward pressure on the later. As described 
previously, Basel III necessitate that banks hold higher levels of better quality capital when 
compared to the prevailing Basel II Accord. Expectedly, the cost of this type of capital comes 
at a premium, ultimately leading to an escalation in the overall cost of a bank’s capital stack. 
As an illustration, Basel II mandates that common shareholder equity should be at least 2% of 
a bank’s qualifying capital, whereas Basel III stipulates that a minimum of at least 4, 5% of a 
bank’s capital holdings must comprise of common equity Tier 1 capital. To put this into 
perspective, a practical example with some basic assumptions is perhaps the best form of 
explanation. Suppose that a bank has R1,000,000 of common equity Tier 1 capital (2%) as part 
of its capital holdings which needs to be increased to R2,500,000 (4,5%) in order to abide by 
the Basel III capital requirements. To achieve this, the bank decides to raise the 
supplementary capital by selling additional shares (or equity) in the market (assuming 
authorized shares still remained). Once the additional R1, 500,000 of common equity has 
been raised, the funds would then be ring-fenced and invested in low yielding cash assets, as 
opposed to being on-lent in the form of residential mortgage assets that generate superior 
returns. Considering a simple scenario such as this, it is evident how the increased capital 
requirements have led to decreased bank profitability as well as a compromised return (in the 
form of profits) on shareholders’ equity (due to a combination of a larger equity base and a 
reduction in profits).  
With bank profitability coming under pressure, and capital requirements starting to balloon, 
how banks are going to handle ROE is an interesting debate. For the context of this research, 
is the provision of long - term housing finance going to be negatively impacted by the banks’ 
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drive to maintain ROE levels? A prevalent pattern of responses was noted among 
respondents. 
Maintaining (or increasing) ROE seems to be the number one priority for some South African 
banks. Respondent E says that he “would be very surprised if the number one priority of his 
banks CEO wasn’t to increase their ROE.” There are a number of methods which a bank can 
employ to influence its ROE. The literature suggested methods such as increasing lending 
spreads on financial transactions, decreasing retails deposit rates, or limiting employee 
emoluments. The responses amongst respondents in terms of how banks were going to react 
to ROE dilutionary pressure was mixed. Some respondents indicated that banks will employ a 
variety of methods, including some of the methods mentioned above, to maintain ROE levels. 
However, two of the other respondents had a different view and were of the opinion that the 
banking market in South Africa was too competitive to simply increase lending rates on their 
finance transactions or reduce deposit rates on retail cash investments. These respondents 
suggest methods such as growth in non – interest type products, the development and growth 
of banking products that are more ‘capital light,’ and becoming increasingly technologically 
savvy will be how banks respond to ROE challenges. One respondent held the notion that “it’s 
not so easy to just increase fees anymore” and that “there is a constant focus on what type 
of lending is done and what type of business models banks use.” Again, this statement relates 
to the strategy of a particular bank and its investment goals. 
 
Diagram 4.2 – Basel III Effects on ROE 
 
 
The various components (i.e. capital requirements, leverage, and the liquidity standards) of 
the Basel III Accord are anticipated to effect bank profitability (and therefore ROE) in different 
Basel III Requirement
Basel III Capital Requirments  - Poss ibl e lean towa rds  loans  that ha ve a  - Increase i n lending rates  (higher
Minimum Common Equi ty Ca pita l lower RWA requirement. Loa ns  with higher instalments )
Minimum Tier 1 Ca pita l RWA requirements  wi l l  potentia l ly be
Minimum Total  Capita l compromised
Leverage Long Term Finance Availability Long Term Finance Affordability
Leverage Rati o (no concern for SA)  - Potentia l  reduction in the term of long  - Increase i n lending rates  (higher
term lending transacti ons  ins ta lments )
Liquidity Standards  - Poss ibl e preference for loa ns  with a   - Reduction in the term of loa ns  (therefore
NSFR shorter duration  higher ins ta l ments)
LCR
ROE
Effect on ConsumersROE Effect & Impact
ROE Neutral No Impact
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ways according to respondents. Diagram 4.2 provides a summary of how each of the 
components of the Basel III regulation are expected to affect ROE, and what these variations 
in ROE imply for consumers with regards to the availability of long - term finance, as well as 
the affordability of long - term finance. Expectedly, the components that are ROE dilutionary 
will negatively affect long - term finance via a reduction in the typical duration of housing 
loans (NSFR specific), as well as via an increase in lending rates. As illustrated, the capital 
requirements as well as the liquidity measures introduced as part of Basel III are likely to result 
in a decrease in ROE; while the newly introduced leverage ratio is not expected to implicate 
the ROE of South African banks due to their low leverage ratios. 
This thesis employs a mixed method research approach utilising a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative research techniques as stated in the chapter three research methodology. 
The quantitative analysis for this research was undertaken with the goal of determining 
whether any of the observations obtained in the interviews could be witnessed through 
variations in bank specific data leading up to key regulatory events. The next section of the 
chapter reveals the quantitative results of the study. Thereafter, the results of both the 
research approaches are discussed with the goal of determining whether the qualitative 
research findings are supported by the quantitative analysis that was undertaken.  
4.2 Quantitative Data Analysis Results 
 
The quantitative aspect of this research employed a three stage time-series data analysis to 
measure the impact of regulatory capital adequacy requirements on aggregate South African 
bank balance sheets between January 2005 and March 2017 – a period covering 12 years. The 
first phase of the study, termed the ‘Implementation Phase,’ spans from the beginning of 
2005 until 1 January 2008 and is characterised by the build-up period to, and succeeding 
implementation of the Basel II Accord on 1 January 2008. Phase two, known as the 
‘Consistency Phase,’ is from January 2008 to December 2012 and is considered a ‘consistent’ 
regulatory period with no new regulatory measures implemented. However, during this 
period, the initial Basel III proposal was released in 2009, and the Basel III Accord 
requirements were published in 2010. Equally significant during this time was the origination 
of the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007 - 2008 that wreaked havoc on banking systems and 
property markets around the world. The final period of the study covers from 1 January 2013, 
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the official ‘phase – in’ commencement date of the Basel III Accord, and ends in March 2017. 
This phase is referred to as the ‘Preparation Phase’ and witnessed the introduction of the 
phase – in arrangements for the LCR on 1 January 2015, as well as the observation period for 
the introduction of the NSFR which began in 2012.  




The goals of this part of the research are outlined as follows: (1) To determine in what ways 
banks typically react to changes in regulatory capital requirements (2) To establish whether 
banks respond to capital requirements by varying qualifying capital, by changing risk weighted 
assets, or by employing both of these strategies. (3) To monitor changes in bank asset 
portfolios with the purpose of determining in what way banks alter investment between 
different asset classes as a result of a changing regulatory landscape. (4) To determine 
whether variations in ROE disturb banks’ lending patterns. 
At this point it needs to be re-iterated that determining the impact of the Basel III Accord on 
long - term housing finance is no easy task. Basel III is only due for full implementation on 1 
January 2019, and its full impact is yet to be known. Furthermore, the data analysis may reveal 
patterns that can be attributed to causes independent of the regulatory environment.  
However, by assessing the statistical trends in the build-up to the implementation of the Basel 
Phase 1
'Implimentation Phase'
(1 January 2005 - 31 December 2007)
Final Version of Basel II Accord 
Completed (2006)




(1 January 2008 - 31 December 2012)
Sub - Prime  Mortgage Crisis          
(2007 - 2008)
Initial Basel III Proposal  
Released (December 2009)




(1 January 2013 - 31 March 2017)
Implimentation of Basel III 
Accord  (1 January 2013)
LCR observation period begins in 
2011 with official 'phase - in' of 
LCR beginning 1 January 2015
NSFR observation period begins 




II Accord, as well as by understanding the components of Basel III and their effects on bank 
lending, an initial assessment of its impact is achievable.  
i. Total Capital Adequacy v Tier 1 Capital Ratio v Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio 
 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
The capital adequacy ratios for South African banks spanning from 2005 to 2017 are depicted 
in Figure 1, and illustrate the trends over all three study phases. The total capital adequacy 
ratio as demonstrated by the purple line shows the aggregate total qualifying capital amongst 
South African banks as a percentage of RWA. The Tier 1 capital ratio (blue line) illustrates Tier 
1 capital in isolation as a ratio of RWA, and the common equity Tier 1 capital ratio (grey line) 
represents common equity Tier 1 capital as a ratio of RWA. These capital indicators have 
specifically been selected for this study as they demonstrate the highest quality forms of 
capital, and are the most pertinent to the Basel III regulatory requirements.  Naturally, all 
three of these ratios are expected to track one another during any periods of fluctuation 
across the timeline. To start, the total capital adequacy ratio has shifted from roughly 13% to 
16% over the study period increasing by approximately 25%. The Tier 1 capital ratio on the 
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other hand has increased from 10% to 13% demonstrating a 30% increase. When compared 
to a near doubling of the capital adequacy ratio between 1991 – 2003 as reported by 
Cumming and Nel (2005), this increase is moderate in comparison. However, the slight 
increase in capital, comparatively speaking, demonstrates the fact that South African Banks 
are, and have historically been, well – capitalised. This is consistent with findings that 
overcapitalized banks prefer to increase asset holdings or reshuffle their RWA when deviating 
from their optimal Tier 1 ratio, as opposed to decreasing asset growth in order to magnify 
their current capital holdings as a ratio of RWA (Schepens and Kok, 2013) - as will be 
demonstrated in Figure 2. 
The first phase of the study period between 2005 and 2008 is relatively stable in terms of 
capital holdings as South African banks had already accumulated sufficient capital adequacy 
in anticipation of the Basel II Accord in January 2008. Capital levels at the beginning of 2005 
already exceed the South African Reserve Bank Basel II requirement of a 9.5% total capital 
adequacy ratio, and a 7% Tier I capital adequacy ratio respectively. Conversely, the second 
phase of the study between February 2008 and January 2011 demonstrates a pronounced 
increase in capital adequacy ratios which may come as a surprise due to the consistency of 
the regulatory environment. However, on closer inspection, this outcome is hardly surprising. 
The sub-prime mortgage crisis that originated between 2007 and 2008 developed into the 
worst financial downturn the world has experienced since the great depression of the 1930’s. 
Global stock markets crashed, property bubbles burst, and ultimately, the availability of bank 
finance began to dissolve. The effect of the financial crisis is revealed over this period with 
growth in total RWA’s (an indicator of bank lending), relative to total qualifying capital slowing 
completely. As a result, capital adequacy ratios escalated as the relative growth in RWA’s 
came to an abrupt halt.  This effect is also demonstrated in Figure 2 and will be discussed in 
the proceeding section. 
The final phase spanning between January 2013 and March 2017 is distinguished by the 
official introduction of the Basel III Accord into the South African regulatory environment. 
Interestingly, during this period, banks were initially un-responsive to the introduction of 
Basel III as capital amounts were well in excess of those required by the international Basel III 
standard, as well as the national Basel III requirements set by the SARB.  However, in March 
2016, total capital adequacy increased from 13.88% to over 16.05%, a relative increase of 
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over 15% in a single year; even with minimum capital requirements already being met. This 
sharp increase in total qualifying capital between March 2016 and March 2017 seems to have 
been further amplified by a negative growth rate in RWA as well. This demonstrates the point 
that there are factors outside of the regulatory environment that have an impact on the 
variation of capital ratios, and that banks hold capital for reasons other than purely banking 
regulations. Factors that may have influenced this particular period could have been political 
uncertainty for example, which ultimately lead to the eventual downgrading of South Africa’s 
credit rating to ‘junk status.’  
ii. Growth of Total Risk Weighted Assets vs Growth of Qualifying Capital 
 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
 
The growth of Risk – Weighted Assets/Off – Balance Sheet items relative to the growth of 
qualifying capital over the observation period is demonstrated in figure 2. The objective of 
this comparison is to determine whether the capital adequacy ratio has increased over the 
study horizon due to the decrease in the growth of RWA relative to total qualifying capital, or 
whether the increase is attributed to an increase in total qualifying capital relative to RWA. 
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These trends are significant as they can be used as an indicator of whether there is a 
slowdown in bank activity preceding or following a particular regulatory event. Over the study 
horizon, total qualifying capital has increased by 251% whereas RWA has increased by 219%, 
suggesting that the corresponding increase in the capital adequacy ratio can be attributed to 
an increase in qualifying capital relative to RWA. However, it is worth noting is that RWA grew 
by a substantial 219% over the observation period indicating that banks were still active on 
the lending front. Adding to this, the banking sector enjoyed sufficient profitability to be in a 
position to augment their capital ratios through the direct increase in qualifying capital as 
opposed to direct reduction in RWA. Growth of RWA during phase 1 of the study period saw 
RWA on a higher growth trajectory than total qualifying capital leading up to the 
implementation of Basel II. The corresponding decrease in the aggregate capital adequacy 
ratio over the same period as observed in figure 1 again reinforces the capital strength 
displayed by South African banks who could afford to increase RWA at a faster rate than 
qualifying capital yet still adhere to the Basel II standards. This trend continued into 2008 
before finally slowing towards the later part of the year when the growth rate of qualifying 
capital exceeded growth in RWA – just before the Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
plummeted to its lowest levels in years following the sub-prime mortgage crisis. This 
particular period was defined by a contraction in bank lending relative to total qualifying 
capital, leading to an increase in the capital adequacy ratio as demonstrated in Figure 1. The 
remainder of the ‘stability’ phase was largely consistent with both RWA and total qualifying 
capital increasing at similar rates. 
Phase 3 of the timeline began with total capital adequacy and RWA increasing 
proportionately. However, 2016 was characterised by the highest increase in total capital 
adequacy relative to RWA experienced over the study period as evidenced in figure 2. As 
discussed previously, no obvious reason can be identified for this sudden increase as South 
African banks already have sufficient capital in their coffers to abide by the Basel III capital 
requirements. Again, this reaction by the banking fraternity is indicative that reasons outside 





iii. RWA  of Loans and Advances 
 
The concept of the risk-weighting of assets, as governed by the Basel Accords, is anticipated 
to affect bank assets in different ways. Obviously, the lower the amount of capital a bank can 
hold against a lending transaction the better (i.e. lower risk weighting). Therefore, it is 
expected that assets with a low risk weightings are preferred over assets with a high risk 
weighting. However, this statement is mentioned with caution as there are various other 
factors outside of capital holding costs that influence a bank’s decision to extend a particular 
type of finance. Some of these reasons may include, but are not limited to, the lending 
facilities raising fee, interest rate, and strategic goals. Nonetheless, a comparison of loan types 
over the study duration is an indicator of how sensitive particular types of loans are to the 
regulatory environment. Owing to the fact that Basel II introduced the internal ratings based 
approach (in January 2008), which is the capital requirement model utilised by all four major 
banks, the period stretching from 2005 to 2008 will be analysed independently to the 
remainder of the study period that extends between 2009 and 2017. The change in reporting 
methods following the introduction of Basel II further solidifies the requirement to analyse 
these phases separately. 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
89 
 
Figure 3 demonstrates the growth in the various bands of risk – weighted assets leading up 
to the implementation of Basel II in 2008, from a base level of 100 at the beginning of 2005. 
This phase was governed by the Basel I Accord regulations, and RWA’s were measured by the 
standardized approach (note that growth in the 150% RWA category has been removed from 
the dataset as this category contributed less the one percent to total RWA. Further, due to a 
low starting base, its annual movements appear drastic in nature). Somewhat unexpectedly, 
the 100%, and 50% risk-weighted categories, which are the two ‘riskiest’ asset classes in the 
dataset, gained the most over this period increasing by 77%, and 96% respectively. However, 
closer inspection reveals that in 2005 banks were already compliant with the capital ratios 
required by Basel II and so had no direct incentive to decrease the risk weighting of their asset 
exposures. As a result, banks continued with speculative lending advances, ultimately 
confirming the theory that undercapitalised banks respond to regulatory changes quicker that 
adequately capitalised banks. Neethling (2014) affirms this by mentioning that banks do not 
have to lower RWA, raise additional capital, or contract credit supply when their capital ratios 
are in excess of the regulatory requirement. The behaviour of these loan patterns suggests 
that adequately capitalised banks still have scope to engage in more ‘risky’ loan activities in a 













iv. Loans and Advances per Category 
 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
Figure 4 displays different loan types, as a percentage of total bank lending, between 2008 
and 2017. The second phase of the review period spanning from 2008 to 2012 is characterised 
by two distinct variations. Firstly, residential loans peak at roughly 35% of total loans, then 
reversed and continued on a downward trajectory towards the Basel III implementation 
deadline. Secondly, term loans and ‘other loans’ remain fairly stable initially, before 
continuing on an upward path in 2010 seemingly to replace what was ‘lost’ in the residential 
loan category. This behaviour is potentially a result of two factors. Either, the risk – weighting 
of residential and term loans have shifted significantly under the parasol of the Basel II 
framework with term loans requiring a lower regulatory capital amount than residential loans. 
Or alternatively, banks are seeking to decrease the terms of their loans by re-shuffling asset 
portfolios away from residential loans (typically twenty to twenty five years in duration) 
towards term loans (typically a 24 – 36 month duration) and other loans (which includes 
redeemable preference shares, loans granted/deposits placed under resale agreements, and 
banks intra-group balances to name a few). 
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Considering the first option, as articulated previously, all four of SA’s major banks utilise the 
advanced internal ratings based approach, with their asset portfolios comprising 
approximately 85 percent of South Africa’s total bank advances (International Monetary 
Fund, 2010). So, aggregate movements among the major four banks (who use the internal 
ratings based approaches) is a worthy indicator when attempting to explain the overall 
fluctuations in bank lending. Testing this proposal, it was found that by employing an 
Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach model that is currently being used by one of South 
Africa’s banks, residential home loans require more capital to be held than a three year 
secured loan (a loan type that is comparable to a term loan that is secured by collateral such 
as listed equities, for example) when considering the same client profile (please note that 
banks develop their own individual IRBA models based on past data as to how different 
profiles of clients have conducted themselves historically, and therefore it cannot be 
guaranteed that all IRBA models used by South African banks will yield that same result. 
However, the outcomes should be relatively consistent). Therefore, the deviation from the 
2008 asset allocations to residential home loans and term loans may be due to the underlying 
risk – weightings that accompany these asset classes. This finding is similar to that of Cumming 
and Nel (2005) who established that residential loans, which were allocated a lower risk 
weighting , increased at a higher rate than general loans, that were given a higher risk 
weighting, in anticipation of the Basel I Accord. 
Considering the second potential explanation, which proposes that banks are aiming to 
decrease the length of their average asset tenors, can be examined by considering the phase 
– in, and introductory dates of the liquidity ratios.  The newly introduced net stable funding 
ratio and liquidity coverage ratio, both which are included in the Basel III framework, seek to 
gauge the funding profile strength of banks. With particular reference to this, the NSFR 
considers the amount of stable long - term funding available as a ratio of the amount of long-
term funding required, as banks attempt to better align the mis-match of long - term loans 
that are currently funded by short term deposits that are less stable in nature. Evidently, the 
objective of the NSFR is two-fold: i.) to decrease the terms (length) of finance agreements and 
ii.) to increase the ‘stickiness’ and duration of deposits.  Considering this, one could argue that 
the decrease in home loan extensions as well as the relative increase in term loans and ‘other 
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loans’ granted are a result of banks attempting to meet the NSFR implementation deadline 
by 1 January 2018.  
The relationship between Return on Equity (ROE) and RWA is an interesting prospect to 
explore. ROE is considered one of the main indicators of bank profitability with its impact on 
loan advances worth investigating. As ascertained in the chapter two literature review, the 
new Basel minimum capital requirements are expected to have a dilutionary effect on bank 
ROE. This fact, coupled with the additional pressure imposed by shareholders to maintain ROE 
in the changing regulatory landscape may force banks to respond in certain ways. Expectedly, 
banks can either respond by aiming to increase non – interest revenues in order to boost 
profitability (and therefore increase ROE). Or alternatively, banks can strive to grow their 
lending books to increase profitability, which would be noted by an increase in RWA. 
As explained previously, banks can increase capital as a percentage of RWA by either reducing 
RWA (which also means a potential decrease in ROE as banks cut lending), or alternatively by 
introducing capital into their balance sheets via retained earnings, etc. However, in Figure 2 
it was demonstrated that although capital was increasing, RWA was also increasing (albeit at 
a slightly slower rate). This indicates that banks have not cut back on RWA growth to effect 
the new capital requirements but have maintained their financing activities. It should be 
remembered that ROE can also be increased in a variety of ways including improving 
operational efficiency, decreasing costs, or increasing a client’s product line at the bank for 
example. However, evidence in Figure 5 suggests that increasing ROE by growing RWA is still 
a priority for banks. Therefore, it can be argued that when ROE levels are low, banks increase 
lending activities and RWA to ‘boost’ ROE in order to meet investor expectations; and when 
ROE levels are high (and capital adequacy is lower) there is an increased focus by banks to 
increase capital adequacy levels through the raising of additional capital as opposed to a 







v. ROE vs RWA 
 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank 
As shown in graph 5, it appears that quarterly growth in ROE and RWA is generally positively 
related. There tends to be an increase in ROE when a positive growth rate in RWA is noted, 
and similarly a decrease in ROE when a negative growth rate in RWA is noted. This observation 
confirms views expressed in the chapter 2 literature review that raising bank capital may be 
ROE dilutive. When comparing Figure 1 against Figure 5, an upward trend in the total capital 
adequacy ratio is accompanied by a reducing growth rate in ROE when analysing the same 
time period. The stable phase of the timeline between 2009 and the 2013 phase -in 
arrangement of Basel III predominantly follows these discussed patters. However, the period 
between September 2015 and September 2016 bucks this trend with ROE increasing while 
RWA is decreasing. This period corresponds to the sudden increase in the total capital 
adequacy ratio experienced in 2016 as highlighted in Figure 1. These irregular movements 
once again reiterate the notion that factors outside of the regulatory environment effect bank 
lending and profitability. Based on the general relationship observed between RWA and ROE, 
it can be suggested that should ROE decrease in the lead up to the full implementation of 
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Basel III in 2019, banks are likely to maintain their financing activities as opposed to 
decreasing RWA and solely relying on other capital ‘light’ business initiatives to bolster 
profitability.  
4.3 Discussion and Analysis 
 
Considering the results from the quantitative and qualitative aspects of this research, the 
exact impact of the Basel III Accord on the availability and affordability of long-term housing 
finance is particularly difficult to determine. However, gauging by the feedback obtained from 
respondents during the qualitative component of this thesis, coupled with the results of the 
quantitative analysis, it appears that the Basel III Accord is anticipated to have an impact on 
long - term housing finance; albeit perhaps not overwhelming by description. 
Qualitative Analysis 
 All respondents who participated in the interview process acknowledged that there will be 
implications on long - term housing finance as a result of Basel III – primarily due to its effect 
on all major components of a bank’s balance sheet. Historically, the Basel Accords have to a 
large extent been regarded as a ‘capital’ intensive framework impacting the banking sector. 
Now, due to the additional dimensions of the Basel III framework, the assets and liabilities 
that encompass a bank’s balance sheet require meaningful consideration as well. As a result 
of this, the Basel III framework is predicted to increase not only the cost of capital, but the 
cost of funding for banks as well. Some of the effects of the Basel III Accord have already been 
felt by consumers according to the majority of respondents in the interviews. This 
circumstance has stemmed from the fact that South African banks have been preparing for 
the implementation of Basel III for a number of years, with the gradual phase – in of the Basel 
III requirements ultimately leading to an increase in the cost of capital, as well as an increase 
in the cost of funding. However, as there are a number of Basel III components still to be 
introduced, further implications resulting from the Basel III Accord can be anticipated. 
Six distinct theme categories were identified during the qualitative aspect of this research 
after an extensive coding process. Each category contained a set of ‘sub-themes’ all linking 
back to the central theme and research questions by virtue of similarities identified between 
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them. The first theme, ‘Balance Sheet Considerations,’ focused on the ensuing changes to a 
bank’s balance sheet as a result of Basel III, found respondents in agreement that all 
components of a bank’s balance sheet will be impacted as a result of the Basel III Accord. The 
revised tiers of capital holding are set to increase the cost of capital, while the NSFR and LCR 
are set to impact both the asset and liability side of the balance sheet, with the cost of funding 
set to increase as a result. Owing to these changes, the overriding consensus shared amongst 
respondents was that pricing (interest rates charged by banks on consumer loans) is bound 
to increase, while the ‘standard’ term of long - term lending facilities may be reduced. These 
effects, resulting from adjustments to banks’ balance sheets, were included within the fourth 
theme that was identified from the interviews – ‘Housing Finance Considerations.’ 
The second theme recognized during the qualitative aspect of this research were ‘Financial 
Uncertainties.’ Within this category, affordability was identified as a major factor that affects 
a large number of South African home buyers. Circumstances such as an increase in interest 
rates, or higher deposit requirements that result from a regulatory measure such as Basel III 
could preclude a significant amount of home buyers from obtaining finance. Further to this, 
and relating to the issue of affordability, are the economic concerns that banks have. 
Comments from respondents suggest that depending on the current economic climate, banks 
may have more of a risk appetite for a particular asset type than others. Principally, this 
feedback demonstrates that a host of factors beyond regulatory amendments can impact a 
bank’s decision whether to extend a particular type of finance. 
A number of the respondents alluded to the fact that changes in a bank’s lending practice can 
be as a result of factors other than bank regulation. Individual banks have their own strategies 
in terms of asset growth, and a cut-back in long - term housing finance for example may result 
from internal investment strategies that are set as opposed to impending bank regulation 
measures. These aspects, together with the recognition that all banks have their own risk 
tolerance levels, point to the fact that each bank follows its own set of internal objectives that 
guide the decision making process. Accordingly, these aspects were included as part of the 
third primary theme that was identified from the research – ‘Internal Objectives.’  
‘General Suppositions’ was the fifth theme identified from the dataset and included further 
context around whether Basel III had any current effects on consumers, as well as whether 
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Basel III would have any direct impact on housing finance due to the perceived ‘riskiness’ of 
housing assets.  Interesting, it seems that housing assets are not always considered to be low 
risk investment vehicles, and Basel III would not necessarily inspire further investment into 
housing assets in the form of long –term housing loans by South African banks. However, due 
to the phase-in approach of the Basel III Accord, it seems that some of the effects of Basel III 
have already been felt by consumers, and a supplementary major decline in housing asset 
finance by the banking sector was not likely (as some of the effects of the Basel III Accord 
have already been filtered through the system). 
The final theme identified during the interview process, ‘Bank Performance,’ relates directly 
to a bank’s profitability. Directly addressing one of the research questions, how bank 
profitability (and therefore ROE) was due to influence the lending aspect of bank behaviour 
was evaluated based on opinions gathered from respondents. As alluded to previously, the 
impeding Basel III regulations are envisaged to result in a dilution of ROE which banks can 
respond to in a variety of ways. Either, banks can aim to prioritise non – interest revenue lines 
that are capital ‘light’ in nature and thereby reduce growth of their asset books. Or 
alternatively, banks can strive to grow their lending books, increasing their profitability, 
resulting in an increased ROE. The feedback from some respondents suggests that due to the 
competitive nature of the South African banking market, simply increasing fees or interest 
rates may not be a viable option for banks, and that additional profitability will need to come 
in the form of supplementary revenue streams that don’t require capital to be held as a 
prerequisite (although bank fees are considered a capital light revenue item, market 
competition would prohibit this as an option). 
Quantitative Analysis 
Analysing the quantitative results of this study reveal a number of factors worth highlighting. 
Firstly, it’s clear that South African banks are particularly well capitalised and are under no 
pressure to escalate their capital ratios in order to meet the minimum capital requirements 
as stipulated by the Basel II and Basel III Accords. Consequently, the upward advances of the 
capital adequacy ratio that were noted over the observation period resulted from banks’ 
supplementing their capital bases, as opposed to reducing their RWA (with the exception of 
the timeframe surrounding the global financial crisis). As a result, the impending Basel III 
97 
 
capital requirements that are set to be officially introduced on 1 January 2019 are not 
expected to result in any significant variances in bank behaviour due to the fact that the South 
African banking sector comfortably meets the required capital requirements. However, along 
with the capital requirements of the Basel III Accord come the liquidity requirements, which 
may result in a more pronounced effect on long - term funding transactions such as housing 
loans. 
Competition in the market amongst banks to attract customer deposits to help meet liquidity 
requirements are likely to result in higher interest rates being paid to customers (a 
development confirmed by the qualitative aspect of this research). Additionally, optimising 
the mix of the deposit book by increasing longer term funding and reducing high cost 
wholesale funding has been a key initiative for South African banks (Winterboer et al., 2011). 
As a consequence, there has been an apparent shift in asset portfolios amongst the banks 
with NSFR ‘friendly’ shorter term facilities taking preference over longer term lending 
facilities.  To this effect, a gradual decline in home loans was identified in 2010 that eventually 
levelled off in 2016. The decrease in home loans virtually emulated the increase in term 
loans/other loans over the same period which suggests that banks were aiming to shorten 
their asset tenors leading up to the implementation date for the NSFR. As described in chapter 
two, the SARB proposed a measure in November 2015 that considers the deposits received 
from financial corporate customers with a residual maturity of less than six months differently 
to the global standard. Resultantly, all South African Banks are expected to be compliant with 
the NSFR by the 1 January 2018 implementation date. Interesting to note is that the SARB 
proposal regarding the treatment of these deposits corresponds almost precisely with the 
levelling off on the cutbacks that were observed with home loan extensions.  
Lastly, based on the discussed results, it is fair to say that capital requirements have 
historically been met by raising additional capital courtesy of South Africa’s well-developed 
capital markets (Cumming and Nel, 2005) as opposed to an outright reduction in credit 
extension – a pattern that is expected to continue towards the Basel III capital 
implementation date on 1 January 2019. Affirming one of the themes identified by the 
quantitative section of this research is that the increased competition amongst banks to 
source household deposits is likely to result in an increase in lending rates as customer 




In summary, the quantitative and qualitative outcomes of this study largely complement one 
another with similar results being found. With direct reference to the research questions, 
what the study reveals about the expected impact of the Basel III regulation on the provision 
of housing finance, the nature and extent of housing finance, as well as bank profitability is 
summarized in the table below: 
Summary of Results 
 
The quantitative and qualitative findings of this study each suggest that long - term housing 
finance as offered in its current form may be subject to change. The reasons for this are 
two-fold. Firstly, the implementation of the newly unveiled liquidity ratios, as well as the 
introduction of more arduous capital requirements, may force banks to alter the structure 
of their housing loans and increase interest rate pricing on loan extensions in order to 
remain Basel III compliant and profitable. Secondly, the Basel III capital requirements are 
expected to have a dilutionary impact on ROE, presumably leading to an increase in interest 
rate pricing in order to maintain or grow ROE, as banks have to contend with a revised 
‘capital stack.’ However, owing to the robust capital structure of the South African banking 
fraternity (as evidenced in the quantitative component of this study), the revised Basel III 
capital measures are not anticipated to drastically effect the provision of long - term 
housing finance. This point is confirmed by a respondent in the qualitative of this research 
    
    
Research  
Method 
Basel III Impact on the 
Provision of Long - term 
Housing Finance 
Basel III Impact on 
Bank Profitability 
Basel III impact on the Nature 




▪ Banks may have a preference 
for loans of a shorter duration 
 
▪ Negative impact on 
bank profitability and a 
dilution of ROE 
▪ Increase in lending rates on 
housing loans 
▪ Decrease in the term of 
traditional housing  loans 
Quantitative 
Findings 
▪ Evidence of a decrease in 
long - term housing loans 
offset by an increase in loans 
of a  short term duration 
▪ Dilution of Bank ROE 
when capital adequacy 
ratios increase 
▪ Evidence of a decrease in 
mortgage loans and an increase in 
term loans (i.e. a general decrease 
in the term of loans) 
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who was of the opinion that any repercussions stemming from the amended capital 
























Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 
5.1 The Research Question 
 
The Basel III Accord has been touted as a banking regulation that will not only impact the 
profitability of the banking sector but will also discourage the provision of long - term housing 
finance in South Africa. The research questions in this study undertook to validate this 
conjecture by establishing the following: i.) When compared to Basel I and Basel II, what effect 
will the implementation of Basel III have on the provision of long - term housing finance in 
South Africa? ii.) How does Basel III affect bank profitability, and will Basel III have an impact 
on the viability of the provision of long - term housing finance by lending institutions? iii.) 
Based on the above, how will this impact on the extent and nature of long - term housing 
finance provision? In order to uncover the answers to these questions, this paper established 
a set of research objectives that once complete, would contribute towards answering each of 
the research questions. 
5.2 Achieving the Research Objectives 
 
The research objectives were as follows: 
i. To understand the fundamentals of the Basel III Accord, including the calculation of Risk 
Weighted Assets (RWA), Probability of Default (PD), Exposure at Default (EAD), and Loss 
Given Default (LGD).  
This objective was achieved by reviewing literature specific to the underlying 
fundamentals of the Basel Accords. All of these components (excluding RWA) are 
inclusive to the Internal Ratings Based Approach’s (IRBA’s), which necessitated the need 






ii. To assess whether the introduction of Basel III will have an impact on overall bank 
profitability. 
One of the key metrics that shareholders scrutinize when determining bank profitability 
is a banks Return on Equity (ROE). To realise the above-mentioned objective, changes in 
aggregate bank ROE statistics leading up to key regulatory events were noted by 
utilising a statistical time – series analysis. Specifically, how ROE had changed in the lead 
up to the full implementation of Basel II, as well the preliminary implementation of Basel 
III provided an indication of how Basel III was destined to effect the profitability of the 
banking sector.  
iii. To determine how the impact of Basel III on bank profitability will influence long - term 
housing finance provision. 
The findings of the in-depth interviews assisted in achieving this objective. The opinions 
obtained from respondents provided insight into how the provision of long - term 
housing finance would be affected should bank profitability be compromised.    
iv. With particular reference to mortgage loans, in what ways will South African banks 
react to regulatory changes in capital requirements. 
This objective was achieved by evaluating the outcomes of the quantitative and 
qualitative research studies. How the provision of mortgage finance by banks had 
previously responded to the implementation of Basel II, and what industry experts 
believed was the most likely outcome (in terms of the provision of long - term finance) as 
a result of a change in capital requirements, were used as a resource to meet this 
objective.     
v. To establish whether banks respond to changes in capital requirements by changing 
risk-weighted assets, or by varying qualifying capital, or by employing both of these 
strategies. 
Similar to objective four mentioned above, this goal was achieved by evaluating the 
outcomes of the quantitative and qualitative research studies. How banks had 
previously responded to changes in capital requirements, and what industry experts 
believed was the most likely outcome (in terms of how banks were anticipated to meet 
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the new capital requirements of the Basel III Accord) as a result of a change in capital 
requirements, were used as a resource to meet this objective.     
vi. Determining the final impact on the provision of housing finance and hence housing 
provision. 
Achieving all of the five aforementioned objectives ultimately assisted in realising this 
objective - numerous questions need to be answered in order to determine the final impact 
on the provision of long - term housing finance. Attaining this objective would ultimately 
assist in finding the answers to the research questions. 
 
The research objectives for this study were achieved by employing a mixed method research 
methodology utilising a combination of both qualitative and quantitate research techniques 
inductive in nature. The qualitative component of the research was undertaken by conducting 
in – depth interviews with a number of respondents employed by some of South Africa’s 
largest banks. The respondents emanated from a variety of divisions within the banking sector 
which assisted in attaining a well-rounded perspective of how Basel III may impact long - term 
housing finance. The interviews were further complimented by what the literature revealed 
as to how the Basel III regulation is anticipated to effect long - term housing finance.  
Drawing on a quantitative model originally developed by Cummings and Nel (2005), the 
quantitative aspect of this research employs a time - series statistical analysis that compares 
data across three distinct time periods.  The first phase of the study spans from the beginning 
of 2005 until 1 January 2008 and is characterised by the build-up to, and the succeeding 
implementation of the Basel II Accord on 1 January 2008. Phase two ranges from the 
beginning of 2008 until the end of 2012 and is considered a ‘consistent’ regulatory period 
with no new regulatory measures implemented. The final period of the study covers between 
1 January 2013, the official ‘phase – in’ commencement date of the Basel III Accord, and ends 
in March 2017. This model uses a longitudinal time series statistical analysis to chart changes 
in key statistics that are influenced by the Basel banking regulations. Data that is analysed 
includes changes in RWA, capital adequacy ratios, ROE, lending volumes, and loan 




5.3 Research Findings 
 
This study has had the benefit of considering and comparing information from a theoretical 
perspective (through a literature review), as well as from a practical standpoint (by way of 
the research findings). 
The current literature relating to the Basel III Accord and its anticipated effects on long - 
term housing finance suggests that the revised capital requirements along with the new 
liquidity measures introduced in the Basel III Accord are bound to have a significant impact 
on the various aspects of long - term housing finance on a universal basis. In South Africa 
however, a slightly different scenario may prevail. 
The findings of the research suggest that the implementation of Basel III in South Africa will 
have a more pronounced impact on the provision of long - term housing finance than when 
compared to Basel I and Basel II. Evidence of this assertion comes in the form of the recently 
introduced liquidity framework, as well as through the design of a revised capital structure 
obligation for banks that is more arduous and expensive to maintain than when compared to 
the current capital requirements of the Basel II Accord. As expected, these measures are 
predicted to adversely affect a banks cost of capital, profitability, and consequently, ROE. 
The unfavourable effects of Basel III on bank profitability and ROE have also given rise to three 
principal areas in which long-term finance in its current form may be subject to change. Firstly, 
the affordability of long - term housing finance may be compromised through an increase in 
lending rates on long - term finance transactions. Secondly, analysis of the research results 
suggest that the ‘standard’ term of long - term lending transactions may be in line for a 
reduction. Lastly, the availability of long - term housing finance may be ‘directly’ compromised 
as banks opt to invest in short term asset portfolios as opposed to long - term lending 
contracts. Additionally, consumers on the lower end of the earnings scale may be excluded 
from accessing bank credit as the alleged escalations in lending rates influence bond 
affordability - essentially an ‘indirect’ effect on the availability of long - term bank finance. 
Before the commencement of this thesis, the goal was set to attain a better understanding of 
the Basel Accords along with their associated mechanics, and how these Basel Accords impact 
a bank’s lending practices - both of these goals have been achieved. After reviewing the 
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results of the research, it is anticipated that long - term housing finance in South Africa will 
be impacted to some extent. However, as South African banks as a whole are well capitalized 
and are already in accordance with the majority of the Basel III measures, the impact of the 
Basel III Accord on consumers is likely to be limited. In fact, it seems that a large part of the 
Basel III effects has already been filtered through to consumers and any further effects will 
be somewhat marginal. However, what is evident, is that certain profiles of consumers will be 
more effected that others. The internal ratings-based approach currently utilised by the big 
four banks yields significantly different results depending on the borrower of funds and the 
associated probability of default. Reading into this suggests that consumers on the lower end 
of the income scale are more likely to feel the effects of the Basel III Accord as RWA 
requirements for those specific transactions increase significantly. Further, any increase in 
lending rates ensuing from the Basel III Accord will add additional affordability pressures as a 
result of increasing monthly instalments. Logically, the housing shortage in South Africa 
occurs in the entry level housing segment. Ironically however, this seems to be the sector that 
will be impacted the most by Basel III.  
5.4 Research Proposition 
 
The research proposition for this thesis was as follows: 
The implementation of Basel III is expected to have a direct negative effect on the profitability 
of the banking sector, which will reduce the availability, and increase the cost of housing 
finance, and will therefore impact negatively on the provision of housing in South Africa. 
Considering the limitations associated with this research, I support the initial proposition of 
this research. The findings of the study suggest that the profitability of the South African 
banking sector will be compromised as a result of the Basel III Accord and its associated capital 
requirements. Further, the availability of long - term housing finance in its current guise may 
be subject to change with banks rather opting for loans with a shorter maturity period. 
Although the housing market in South Africa is not expected to be greatly impacted by the 
Basel III Accord, the lower income sector of the market is expected to be impacted the most 





The Basel III Accord only requires bank compliance by 1 January 2019, and is still in the early 
stages of implementation with a number of its major components still to be ‘phased – in.’ As 
a result, this research does have its limitations given that the tangible effects of the Basel III 
Accord are still unidentified. Thus, the views obtained from the literature concerning the 
effects of Basel III, as well as the opinions obtained from respondents regarding how Basel III 
will impact the banking environment are subjective and have no verifiable grounds. However, 
by assessing how the banking sector previously reacted to the implementation of the Basel II 
Accord, a preliminary assessment of the Basel III impact is possible. With regards to the 
qualitative aspect of this research, the sample size of the study was limited due to the fact 
that there are relatively few Basel III experts within the banking environment that have the 
appropriate Basel III knowledge to discuss the topic in any meaningful depth which obviously 
limits one’s ability to generalize the results. However, this shortcoming was mitigated by the 
fact that the conclusions drawn from this study are derived from the literature, along with 
the quantitative aspect of the research. 
In addition to these limitations is the fact that the revised Accord contains a number of key 
modifications unique to the Basel III Accord, which are not included in the prevailing Basel I 
and II regulations. Two of these reforms, the Net Stable Funding Ratio, and the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio, are such examples. Consequently, the effects of these ratios have no prior 
exemplars as a basis of comparison, also adding to the limitations of the research. 
Nevertheless, an understating of the mechanics that comprise these ratios, as well as what 
components of a bank’s balance sheet are going to be implicated as a result of the 
introduction of these measures, gives way to an informed account of the likely impact that 
the Basel III Accord and its newly introduced regulatory measures will have on long - term 
housing finance in South Africa. 
Due to the limitations encountered in the research, the likely impact of a banking regulation 
such as Basel III on long - term housing finance can only be determined through the analysis 
of historical data, as well as by the collection of subjective opinions.  Therefore, the conclusion 
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to this research comes with a caveat in that the research outcome of this study is based upon 
independent interpretation as opposed to tangible facts. 
5.6 Future Research 
 
The Basel Accords are a set of extremely complex bank regulations that require an in-depth 
study to fully understand their intricacies and are beyond the confines of this thesis. However, 
it is believed that this thesis has contributed to gaining an understanding of the core 
components of Basel III, and how these components impact bank finance and consequently 
the housing market. Research that is focused around housing and any element that may 
impact housing provision is important for a developing country like South Africa that suffers 
from income inequality as well as an acute housing shortage. As bank regulation becomes 
tighter, and bank profits become more strained, it will be interesting to see how growth in 
non-traditional banking systems in South Africa respond. Shadow banking for example, when 
considering its narrow definition, is a growing $34 trillion global industry that helps support 
real economic activity, and provides a valuable alternative to bank funding (Financial Stability 
Board, 2017).  Accordingly, further research pertaining to finance that is available through 
non – bank credit providers who are not subjected to the same stringent regulations and costs 
as traditional banks (such as shadow banking), would be a helpful in ascertaining whether 
these types of financial institutions would have a positive influence on helping South African 
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A1. The Basel Framework Implimentation Timeline for South Africa1 
Source:  RMB Global Markets Research Regulatory Update: Basel III 
 
A2. Changes in Capital Ratios 
   
Description Basel II Basel III 
Common Equity Requirement 2.00% 4.50% 
Tier 1 Capital 4.00% 6.00%* 
Tier 2 Capital 4.00% 2.00% 
Total Capital 8.00% 8.00% 
Tier 3 Capital Exists Phase Out 
Capital Conservation Buffer N/A 2.5% of Common Equity Tier 1 
Counter Cyclic  Buffer N/A 0 - 2.5% of RWA 










A3. Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
i.) High Quality Liquid Assets 
 
              Source: Nedbank Group Limited Basel III & IFRS 9 Investor Presentation (November 2015) 
ii.) Net Cash Outflows 0 to 30 Days   
 
                Source: Nedbank Group Limited Basel III & IFRS 9 Investor Presentation (November 2015) 







Level 2 A assets
Sovereign & Public Sector assets
(Risk weight < 20%)¹
Corporate securities AA- or higher
Covered bonds AA- or higher
Level 2 B assets
RMBS 75%
Corporate securities A+ to BBB 50%
Listed equities 50%
Committed liquidity facility Max 40% 100%




NCOF 0 to 30 Days
Client-type / Tenor LCR Positive / LCR Negative Run-off Factor
Cash Outflows < 30 Days
Deposit Outflows
Retail & SME deposits 10%
Operational deposits 25%
Non-operational deposits: Non-financial commercial deposits 40%
Non-operational deposits: Financial Wholesale Deposits 100%
Unsecured Funding Outflows
Capital Market Instruments 100%
Secured FundingOutflows
Level 1 assets repo (sell / buy) 0%
Level 2 assets repo (sell / buy) 15%
Other Outflows
Derivatives & other outflows 100%
Committed/Uncommitted credit & liquidity facilities 5% to 10%
Cash Outflows < 30 Days
Secured Lending Inflows
Level 1 assets reverse repo (buy/ sell) 0%
Level 2 assets reverse repo (buy/sell) 15%
Other Inflows
Retail & commercial entity loans & advances 50%
Financial entity loans & advances 100%
Derivative & other inflows 100%
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A4. NSFR Composition 
 
Source: Nedbank Group Limited Basel III & IFRS 9 Investor Presentation (November 2015) 
 
Client-type / Tenor
< 6 mths > 6 mths < 1 Year > 1 Year
Qualifying Capital 100% 100% 100%
Retail & SME Deposits 90% 90% 100%
Non-financial Commercial Deposits 50% 50% 100%
Financial Operational Deposits 50% 50% 100%
Financial Non-Operational Deposits 0% 50% 100%
Repo Transactions 0% 50% 100%
Other Liabilities 0% 50% 100%
Asset-type / Tenor
< 6 mths > 6 mths < 1 Year > 1 Year
Coins & notes, excess central bank reserves 0% 0% 0%
Loans to Financial institutions secured by Level 1 assets (Reverse Repos) 10% 50% 100%
Loans to Financial institutions 15% 50% 100%
Loans to Retail & SME customers (maturity < 1 year) 50% 50% -
Residential Mortgages (Risk weight < 35%) (LTV<80%) 50% 50% 65%
Loan to Non-Financial entities (Risk weight < 35%) (AAA to AA-) 50% 50% 65%
Loan to Non-financial customers (Risk weight > 35%) (LTV>80%, A+ or less) 50% 50% 85%
Exchange traded equities, commodities, Initial margin against derivatives - - 85%
Non performing loans / Derivative assets 100% 100% 100%
All other on-balance sheet assets 100% 100% 100%
Off-Balance sheet obligations 5% 5% -
ASF
RSF
